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Abstract 
The multiverse hypothesis (the view that there is not just one world or universe in 
existence, bur rather that there are many) is the leading alternative to the competing fine-tuning 
hypothesis (the laws of physics and constants are fine-tuned for the existence of life).  The 
multiverse dispels many aspects of the fine-tuning argument by suggesting that there are 
different initial conditions in each universe, varying constants of physics, and the laws of nature 
lose their known arbitrary values; thus, making the previous single-universe argument from fine-
tuning incredibly weak.  The position that will be advocated will be that a form of multiverse 
could exist and that any level of Tegmark’s multiverse does not circumvent the fine-tuning 
argument for the existence of a fine-tuner (a mind).  An argument will be presented suggesting 
that the multiverse could strengthen the fine-tuning argument by narrowing down the parameters 
of the data to a more fundamental description needed for the multiverse to function as it does 
since it may be the case that some physical descriptions are not the same in every universe.  That 
is, the task of explaining how the multiverse mechanism functions cannot be accounted for by 
the multiverse itself.  Fine-tuning by a mind serves as a sufficient and best explanation for the 
data. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
I. Preliminary Comments 
 The task of this thesis will be to demonstrate that there is fine-tuning of nomic behavior 
for the existence of human life in the universe and, if a multiverse exists, that there is fine-tuning 
behind the multiverse. The fundamental constants of nature, laws of physics, and the 
mechanisms needed for bubble universe inflation will serve as evidence for the hypothesis that 
there is a fine-tuner. It is not the task of this thesis to answer the teleological question with a 
descriptive answer to what the purpose of life is; rather, the task at hand will be to argue that 
there is a purpose, which is detectable via purposive fine-tuning.   
 There is no doubt among cosmologists and philosophers that the universe we inhabit is 
fine-tuned, per se. If the value of physical laws were any different then this universe could not 
produce observers. Fine-tuning is a metaphysically and religiously neutral term used to simply 
state that if the universe had been otherwise it would not harbor human life.  The question is 
whether this fine-tuning is the result of a fine-tuner or whether it is just a semantic tool to 
describe the balanced values that is explained by competing non-fine-tuning hypotheses. The 
term design does, however, carry metaphysical and religious implication.  In recent decades 
these metaphysical and religious implications have been under criticism and rejected by many as 
an acceptable explanatory hypothesis for the cosmological data. It is my contention that the fine-
tuning of nomic behavior in multiverse scenarios is the consequence of an antecedent mind—a 
fine-tuner. The more information—the values of laws and constants—the more demand for an 
explanans. The more universes there are the more information there is. A mind is the only known 
explanans for the origin of information (and not merely the change of information).  
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II. Defining Terms and Abbreviations 
1. Universe. Whenever I refer to this term I refer to it as a single sub-system composed of 
its own initial conditions, constants, laws of nature, etc., which are causally distinct from 
other sub-systems. An example of this would be referential to what we understand to be 
our observable region/system (the Hubble volume, almost 100 billion light years in 
diameter, or a Friedmann-Robertson-Walker [FRW] system).  This would also include 
any system that is very small and may have or will collapse.1 The aggregate of these sub-
systems would compose a multiverse. 
2. Multiverse. This will refer to the landscape of all space and time and may consist of 
many universes or a set of universes. The semantic domain for multiverse encompasses 
four different descriptions of reality.  For definitions of the different types of multiverses 
please see chapter four sections II-IV. 
a. Level One Multiverse (L1M). 
b. Level Two Multiverse (L2M). 
c. Level Three Multiverse (L3M). 
d. Level Four Multiverse (L4M). 
3. Observer.  An observer is any intelligent agent that has the ability to live and function in 
the given system in which it inhabits.  By intelligence I mean the ability to rationalize, 
think, and be self-aware.  This does not include mere life since all life is not intelligent 
life, i.e. bacterium does not meet the sufficient conditions for intelligent life nor do 
rabbits because they do not meet the criteria for intelligence. This is similar, if not 
identical, to human beings (homo sapiens sapiens). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Unless otherwise noted, universe will not include other branches of the wavefunction in unitary 
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4. Constants. Physical constants are the values of certain spacetime, energy, and natural 
laws that have a set parameter that determine the structure and function of a life-
permitting universe. Constants will vary in value from universe to universe in multiverse 
scenarios. When I refer to ‘constants’ here I mean what we presently observe as being 
constant. For example, the value of gravity may vary from universe to universe. No 
matter which universe is indexed the value of gravity will always be determined by a 
mind referred to in the fine-tuner hypothesis. The following are this universe’s constants 
and their values.2 
a. Constants of Space and Time. 
1. Planck length (the minimum interval of space), lp = 1.62 x 10-33 cm. 
2. Planck time (the minimum interval of time), tp = 5.39 x 10-44 sec. 
3. Planck’s constant (this determines the minimum unit of energy 
emission), h = 6.6 x 10-34 joule seconds. 
4. Velocity of light, c = 300,000 km/sec. 
b. Energy Constants. 
5. Gravitational attraction constant, G = 6.67 x 10-11 Nm2/kg2. 
6. Weak force coupling constant, gw = 1.43 x 10-62. 
7. Strong nuclear force coupling constant, gs = 15. 
c. Individuating Constants (Composition of the Electromagnetic Force). 
8. Rest mass of a proton, mp =1.67 x 10-27 kg. 
9. Rest mass of an electron, me = 9.11 x 10-31 kg. 
10. The electron or proton unit charge, e = 1.6 x 10-19 coulombs. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 As found in Robert J. Spitzer’s New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of 
Contemporary Physics and Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 52-56. 
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11. Minimum mass in our universe, (hc/G)½ = 2.18 x 10-8 kg. 
d. Large-Scale and Fine Structure Constants. 
12. Rest mass (the current observable mass of the universe) = 1053 kg. 
13. Boltzmann’s constant, k = 1.38 x 10-23 J/°K 
14. Hubble constant, H = 2 x 10-18 (SI units—le système international 
d'unités [metric units]). 
15. Cosmological constant, Λ < 10-53 (SI units). 
16. Cosmic photon/proton ratio, S = 109 (SI units). 
17. Permittivity of free space, ε = 8.85 x 10-12 (SI units). 
18. Electromagnetic fine structure constant, α = 7.30 x 10-3 (SI units). 
19. Weak fine structure constant, αw = 3.05 x 10-12 (SI units). 
20. Gravitational fine structure constant αG = 5.90 x 10-39 (SI units). 
5. Fine-Tuner Hypothesis (FT). The hypothesis that the values of physical constants and 
laws are the consequence of an antecedent mind that causally determined the values. This 
mind must be antecedent to any universe or multiverse. This only requires that there be 
one mind to determine the values. One mind is sufficient for the origin of information and 
the set values of each universe or multiverse. Many minds are not inconsistent with this 
hypothesis but it does not require many minds since they will become superfluous. It may 
be the case that there are many minds that can or have determined the values but the 
quantity of minds is irrelevant. It is important to remember that this hypothesis does not 
and cannot argue for God.3 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 When I refer to ‘God’ here I refer to the classic understanding of God being the greatest conceivable 
being. FT cannot make and postulations about this mind’s power, goodness, aseity, special revelation, etc. 
This argument may be used in a cumulative case argument for the existence of God but is not sufficient in 
itself for the conclusion of FT to be God. 
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6. Non-Fine-Tuner Hypothesis (~FT). Any explanatory hypothesis for the origin of 
information and the values of physical constants and laws contrary to FT. 
7. Life-Permitting Universe (LPU).  This will refer to the spatiotemporal universe system 
in which observers can exist. 
8. Life-Permitting Multiverse (LPM). This will refer to any level of the multiverse that 
functions in an anthropically friendly manner resulting in the production of LPUs. 
9. Metaphysical Multiverse (MM). 
10. Necessitarianism (NT). 
11. Regularity Theory (RT). 
III. The Problem for Fine-Tuning in the Milieu of the Multiverse 
 The multiverse hypothesis is the leading alternative to the competing hypothesis that the 
observed fine-tuning is the result of a fine-tuner (FT).  The multiverse dispels many aspects of 
the fine-tuning argument by suggesting that there are different initial conditions in each universe, 
varying constants of physics, and the laws of nature lose their known arbitrary values; thus, 
making the previous single-universe FT argument incredibly weak. 
 There are four options for why design is either unnecessary to invoke or illusory if the 
multiverse hypothesis is used as an alternative explanans. Design might be (1) illusory if life 
could adapt to very different conditions or if values of constants could compensate each other. 
Additionally, (2) it might be a result of chance or (3) it might be nonexistent because nature 
could not have been otherwise.  With hopes of discovering a fundamental theory of everything 
all states of affairs in nature may perhaps be tautologous.  Finally, (4) it may be a product of 
cosmic Darwinism, or cosmic natural selection, making the measured values quite likely within a 
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multiverse of many different values.4 The succeeding sections will be explications of the form of 
the argument and the competing hypotheses. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Ibid., 4. 
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CHAPTER TWO: COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
I. The Fine-Tuning Hypothesis 
 In this section I will argue that the form and methodology in making the FT argument 
requires careful attention and explication.  The method of reasoning used for the argument 
should be presented in an abductive form.  When put into an abductive form it can appear in 
several different versions.  However, given the role of probability and the need for a formal 
structure I am advocating a modified version of Robin Collins’: 
1) Given the fine-tuning evidence, a life permitting universe/multiverse (LPM) is very, very 
unlikely under the non-existence of a fine-tuner (~FT): that is, P(LPM|~FT & k’) ≪ 1. 
2) Given the fine-tuning evidence, LPM is not unlikely under FT (the fine-tuner 
hypothesis): that is, ~P(LPM|FT & k’) ≪ 1. 
3) Therefore, LPM strongly supports FT over ~FT. 
Remember that k’ represents some appropriately chosen background information that does not 
include arguments for the existence of God, while merely k would encompass all background 
information, which would include the other arguments, and ≪ represents much, much less than 
(thus, making P(LPM|~FT & k’) close to zero).5 
 A defense of premise (1) would simply require examples of fine-tuning and the options 
available.  The argument has been bifurcated, which proposes a fine-tuner hypothesis and a non-
fine-tuner hypothesis (~FT). I believe this is the most basic form of the first premise since FT 
encapsulates everything being argued for and ~FT includes any other attempt at explaining the 
data.  Whether ~FT is chance, necessity, a combination of chance and necessity, or anything else 
~FT sufficiently accounts for these types of explanations.  In providing examples of the data and 
fine-tuning evidence the most modest and minimal case should be argued for, which I would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Arguments for the existence of God taken in to the total background knowledge would certainly 
increase the probability for the existence of a fine-tuner. However, I want to keep the argument as modest 
as possible and in doing so I will exclude other apologetic arguments. Robin Collins, “The Teleological 
Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology Eds. William Lane Craig and J.P. 
Moreland (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2009), 207. 
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consider as the values of the laws of nature and the mechanisms6 that allow the multiverse to 
function as it does.  Premise (1) requires the truth of counterfactually reliable expressions of the 
laws of physics.7 
 There are two ways of understanding the definition of fine-tuner: a positive and negative 
definition.  By fine-tuner in the positive sense I mean a mind, or agent, capable of articulating 
information (a specified and complex information).  Not only would this mind be merely capable 
in articulating this information but also intended to articulate the precise information we find in 
nature.8  The negative definition is the insufficiency of necessity, regularity, mindless chance, or 
any other combination of the sort as being the best explanation for the data. Note that a fine-tuner 
is distinct from a mere intelligence since intelligence can mimic regularity or chance, and 
thereby rendering its actions indistinguishable from regularity or chance.9  Thus, it is important 
to recognize the combination of the two definitions, which serve different explanatory roles but 
are identical in reference. 
 In defense of premise (2), the best scientific evidence does suggest fine-tuning in the 
sense that counterfactual expressions of the values of laws and constants would not produce a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This will be discussed and greater detail and defended in Chapter 6 Section IV. For further reference 
the four mechanisms I am referring to are: (1) A mechanism to supply the energy needed form the bubble 
universes: The fine-tuning of the inflation field. (2) A mechanism to form the bubbles. The actual 
mechanism is Einstein’s field equations + inflation field. (3) A mechanism to convert the energy of the 
inflation field to the normal mass/energy we find in our universe. The actual mechanism is E=mc2 + 
coupling between the inflation field and matter fields. (4) A mechanism that allows enough variation in 
the constants of physics among universes (one of the predictions of quantum cosmology is random 
constants). The actual mechanism is superstring theory or M-theory. Collins, 263-267. 
 
7 An example of a counterfactually reliable expression of physics would be that if the value of the 
strong nuclear force were any stronger than its current observable value then there could not be complex 
atomic structures. Another example is that if the Pauli Exclusion Principle did not exist then atomic nuclei 
would suck in orbiting electrons. 
 
8 This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6 on the role and origin of information. 
 
9 William Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 36. 
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life permitting universe (LPU) or observers. The FT hypothesis is a religiously neutral position.   
If FT is true the identity of the fine-tuner cannot be known by FT alone. FT is perfectly 
compatible with a variety of religious beliefs.10 The question is whether it is more reasonable to 
infer the existence of a fine-tuner to produce a product that exhibits fine-tuning or whether this 
happened by chance.  If a multiverse scenario is being considered this method of argumentation 
and use of probability certainly allows for an infinite set of universes.  Usually, given the sample 
size of an infinite set the probability of a life-permitting universe is precisely 1.  However, as 
previously stated, it is the mechanisms that drive the random variations in the laws of physics 
that require fine-tuning.  If a finite set is being considered, Andrei Linde and Vitaly Vanchurin 
recently published a paper suggesting that there are 101010
7
 universes in the multiverse landscape 
as a product of inflation.11  We know at least one universe that exhibits life that may have been 
randomly produced. Or, this could be a product of nomic necessity but there does not seem to be 
an account for explaining the nomic necessity as a logical or metaphysical necessity. A strong 
case would have to be made. It will be argued that such explanations are insufficient in the 
succeeding section.  
 The conclusion follows logically from the premises.  This gets us to an extremely 
intelligent agent.  The amount of information and values in one universe needs to be explained 
and the multiverse scenario provides more information to be explained.  Thus, the evidence of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 I am assuming religious beliefs entail that the identity of that being worshiped is known and that 
there are corresponding dogmas and worship of the being. When arguing for design, the argument cannot 
take one to Christianity or even God.  All one can purport is an intelligent cause. The evidence cannot 
identify who or what the cause is.  This is constructive empiricism.  Constructive empiricism states that 
one can only refer to the aspects of that being, in this case, the intelligence of the cause, respective to the 
issue and evidence at hand. 
 
11 Andrei Linde and Vitaly Vanchurin, “How Many Universes are in the Multiverse?” 
arXiv:0910.1589 (Oct. 2009): 10. 
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the fine-tuning we observe, the values of constants and laws of nature, is much, much more 
likely under the hypothesis that there is a fine-tuner. 
II. The Non-Fine-Tuning Hypothesis 
 The ~FT has several different forms but, broadly speaking, is anything other than FT.  
There are three primary ~FT versions: chance, necessity, and chance and necessity.  Each one 
has different explanatory strengths and weaknesses.  In this section I will define the terms of the 
hypothesis.  In chapters five and six I will elaborate on specific models of the respective 
hypotheses. 
 It is important to qualify this explanatory hypothesis of chance.  Chance can appear as 
mindless chance or as a finely-tuned chance.  Suppose that I have a pair of dice of which I have 
the ability to control what the values will be when rolled.  There are two different ways I could 
do this.  The first is to choose which value will appear for each die when thrown.  If I choose two 
sixes then, when thrown, the dice land on two sixes. Perhaps I achieve this by placing small 
magnets in the dice and throw them on a magnetic table with an opposite pole so when the 
magnets attract the two sixes are on top.  The second way I could control the values is by setting 
specified parameters.  I could accomplish this by having the same magnets in the dice but have 
the table magnet with the same pole so the magnets repel forcing the dice to not land on a certain 
value.  To give another illustration, suppose I cover the black 26 and the red 32 on a roulette 
wheel so the ball cannot land in those spots.  By setting these parameters there is a purposive 
elimination of possible outcomes but the remaining outcomes would still be a product of chance. 
Thus, ~FT will refer to mindless chance. 
 Necessity, also known as necessitarianism (NT), attempts to account for the values of the 
laws of nature as nomic necessity.  The necessitarian states that there are metaphysical 
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connections of necessity in the world that ground and explain the most fundamental regularities.  
Necessitarian theorists usually use the word must to express this connection.12  Thus, 
necessitarianism maintains must-statements are not adequately captured by is-statements (must ≠ 
is, or certain facts are unaccounted for).13  
 There is a slight distinction between the necessitarian position and a regularist position. 
Regularity theory (RT) states that the fundamental regularities are brute facts; they neither have 
nor require an explanation.  Regularity theorists attempt to formulate laws and theories in a 
language where the connectives are all truth functional.  Thus, each law is expressed with a 
universal quantifier as in [(x) (Px ⊃ Qx)].14  C.D. Broad argued that the very fact that laws entail 
counterfactuals is incompatible with regularity theory.15  He suggests that counterfactuals are 
either false or trivially true. If it is now true that Q occurs if P causally precedes Q then the 
regularist may sufficiently account for past counterfactual claims.  Given the present antecedent 
condition of P at tn and P implies Q at tn and it was true that P implied Q at tn-1 and using P as an 
antecedent for R at hypothetical tn-1’ then R is true if P was a sufficient condition R at tn-1’. Thus, 
regularity accounts for past counterfactuals, but this is trivially true.  However, in positive favor 
of necessitarianism, there is no reason to expect the world to continue to behave in a regular 
manner as presupposed by the practice of induction.  The regularist may point out that 
generalizations from finite sample sets cannot be warranted unless the appropriate necessary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Robin Collins, “God and the Laws of Nature,” Philo 12 no. 2 (2009): 2-3. (Preprint). 
 
13 Bernard Berofsky, “The Regularity Theory,” Nous 2 no. 4 (1968): 316. 
 
14 Ibid., 315. 
 
15 C.D. Broad, “Mechanical and Teleological Causation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: 
Supplementary Volumes (1935): XIV. 
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connections are postulated, which is this problem of induction.16  This is a problem whose 
examination has often been the occasion for the introduction of necessitarianism. Unless a 
necessitarian is prepared to say that the relation of necessity is actually observed in the instances 
of some law, the inference to a necessary law creates the problem of induction just as easily.17  
The reason why this distinction between regularity theory and necessitarianism is so important is 
because there must be an appropriate random sample to make a probability argument from 
cosmology.  These two positions are slightly different but both allow for counterfactual claims 
the proponent of ~FT is forced to commit to, which eliminates objections based on a claim of 
inappropriate random sampling. 
 A combination of chance and necessity may seem contradictory but the way it is used as 
an explanans allows for a harmonious compatibility.  For example, consider the bio-chemical 
structure of a DNA strand, which is composed of a sugar-phosphate backbone and four different 
nucleotides as the rungs.  Because of the chemical structure adenine always pairs with thymine 
and guanine always pairs with cytosine.  Guanine and thymine bond in a DNA helix.  This would 
be an example of the role of necessity.  This chemical necessity combines with chance when we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For example, consider gold having an atomic weight of 196.966543.  This follows necessarily from 
gold’s atomic structure but gold is contingent.  With this being an analytic a posteriori claim there is no 
counterfactual claim that is true about the atomic weight.  The law of alpha particle decay in the half-life 
of a uranium atom is purely probabilistic.  The probability remains constant over time and is the same in 
every uranium atom, and there is no difference at all between two uranium atoms one of which decays 
and the other does not in the next minute.  It is the case that introducing a laser into the atomic nucleus of 
232U, which alters the stability of the atom and accelerates the alpha and beta decay, can alter the rate of 
decay. However, the fact remains that when the decay occurs is determined by the quantum world of 
probability (depending on one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics). In either of these two neither 
necessitarianism nor regularity theory provide a preferred explanation for such counterfactual states of 
affairs. Such counterfactual claims are empty with certain laws.  Some may have counterfactual truth and 
others are vacuous.  If one were to attempt to express such alpha decay as [(x) (Px ⊃ Qx)], for every 
alpha particle, if an alpha particle of uranium obtains then the alpha particle will decay is true but cannot 
be causally or temporally indexed. Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
92. A.V. Simakin and G.A. Shafeev, “Accelerated Alpha-Decay of 232U Isotope Achieved by Exposure of 
its Aqueous Solution with Gold Nanoparticles to Laser Radiation,” arXiv:1112.6276 (Dec. 2011), 1-2. 
 
17 Berofsky, 325-26. 
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consider the order of the sugar-phosphates.  There is no chemical bond, which necessitates the 
order in which the sugar-phosphates are positioned vertically in the helix.  A rung of adenine and 
thymine may be followed by a guanine and cytosine or it may simply be repeated.  There is no 
chemical law requiring a specific order of the sugar-phosphate bonds.  This is simply an example 
from biology.  Examples can be given in physics and cosmology as well.  For instance, Stephen 
Hawking argues that given the law of gravity (a necessity) a universe will form by happenstance 
(chance).18 
 The Princeton philosopher David Lewis and M.I.T. physicist Max Tegmark have 
postulated a metaphysical multiverse (MM) to account for the behavior of natural laws.  Their 
proposed multiverse scenarios entail modal realism.19 Under such a MM different regions of 
space will exhibit different effective laws of physics (i.e. difference constants, dimensionality, 
particle content, relation of information, information propagation, etc.) corresponding to different 
local minima in a landscape of possibilities.20  This could obtain in several different ways such 
as the local bubble location in a string landscape or in unitary quantum physics the wave function 
does not collapse and all possibilities are actualized.  Such an approach denies counterfactual 
definiteness.  This means that any counterfactual of what measurements have not been performed 
are empty of any meaning and truth. 
 These MM scenarios allow for the proponents to get the best of both worlds.  It avoids the 
problem of RT by having variance in the behavior of laws.  A tropical fish never leaving the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Random House, 
2010), 173-81. 
 
19 This modal realism is, in a sense, modally limited.  The state of affairs of the non-existence of 
anything cannot be true if something does exist so by definition modal realism must entail ~∃!W with W 
being the non-existence of anything—nothing, lest it suffer the consequence of being intrinsically 
incoherent and thus requires a model akin to NT. 
 
20 Max Tegmark, “The Multiverse Hierarchy,” arXiv:0905.1283v1 (May 2009): 1. 
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ocean might mistakenly conclude that the properties of water are universal, not realizing that 
there is also ice and steam.  We may be smarter than fish but may just as easily be fooled.21  This 
is a shortcoming of RT for all we know such regularities are localized instantiations.  The 
problems of NT and RT are avoided but it takes on its own problem similar to the NT problem of 
accounting for the mechanisms that produce the varying laws and values. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
I. The Logic of the Fine-Tuning Argument 
The fine-tuning argument argues that when the physics and the laws of nature are 
expressed mathematically their values are ever so balanced in ways that permit the existence of 
life.  This claim is made on the basis that existence of vital substances such as carbon, and the 
properties of objects such as stable long-lived stars, depend rather sensitively on the values of 
certain physical parameters, and on the cosmological initial conditions.22  I am merely arguing 
that the universe/multiverse is fine-tuned for the essential building blocks and environments that 
life requires for cosmic and biological evolution to even occur.  The argument has several 
different forms in contemporary literature.  In this section I will present the argument in its 
deductive and inductive forms and offer criticism.  Then abductive reasoning, or inference to the 
best explanation, will be assessed, along with the role of probability, and I will advocate this as 
the proper methodology and form for the fine-tuning argument. 
 The argument is a posteriori gathered from the natural sciences.  The method by which 
design will be inferred is a historical science.  There are four differences between a historical 
science and a laboratory science.  First, repeatability is not applicable in the historical sciences; it 
is a metacriterion for laboratory science.  Second, historical science assumes uniformitarianism, 
that is, there are presently known causes to phenomena, which can be inferred by perceived 
effects.23  Third, the theories and explanatory hypotheses must lay in empirical harms way.  The 
conclusions must be falsifiable.  It should be noted that the type of scientific inquiry will be that 
of an Augustinian science as opposed to a Duhemian science. Augustinian science permits and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Paul Davies, “How Bio-Friendly is the Universe?” arXiv:astro-ph/0403050v1 (March 2004), 1. 
 
23 The method of uniformitarianism is currently understood in the scientific community as an 
assumption of the regular course of events as well as catastrophism (which would be implied by the 
presently known cause and effect relationships). 
! 16!
carries open metaphysical presuppositions with science.  Duhemian science strips science of all 
metaphysical imports.  This point yields to the final distinction, which is the understanding that 
historical science must use non-controversial reasoning.  The controversial claim for the FT 
proponent is simply the introduction of agent causation.  However, this is not as controversial as 
much of the scientific community makes it out to be.  Agency is publically accepted evidence by 
experience (this is not based on religious explanations or religious experience). 
In the following sections I will examine problems with deductive and inductive 
arguments, which are most commonly used for fine-tuning arguments. I will then examine 
abductive arguments and argue that inference to the best explanation should be the preferred 
methodology for constructing FT arguments. 
A. The Problem of Deduction 
 In a correct deductive argument if the premises are true the conclusion is true regardless 
of whether or no further evidence is considered.  There must be a reasonable connection or 
relationship between the conditions in a deductive argument (in the instance of implication).  
Consider the argument, as modus ponens, that if the moon’s core is made of cheese then my desk 
is made out of mahogany.  What relationship do these two conditions have?  The truth-value is 
valid (F-T-T).  However, I recognize that this is merely a preference, which is, at times, 
convenient.  When making a novel explanans and prediction the relationship between the 
conditions may not be epistemically evident. 
 There are generally three options, which are often considered as an explanation for the 
fine-tuning data: chance, necessity, a combination of chance and necessity, or a fine-tuner.  One 
immediate problem in implementing explanatory options in a deductive manner is that the first 
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premise may be false wherein it may be lacking in options and the argument still is valid.  When 
these options are used in a [strict] deductive argument24 it may appear as: 
1) The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design. 
2) It is not due to physical necessity or chance. 
3) Therefore, it is due to design.25 
From the very onset of the argument it may be unsound.  Perhaps there are more options to be 
considered in premise 1.  It would still be valid but how strong of an argument, or how 
convincing, would it be if the options given were restricted?  An objector could merely appeal to 
an option not given, whatever that may be, perhaps 1 is not exhaustive or nuanced enough, and 
the argument rests stillborn from the very beginning.   
 In regards to this specific argument, if the hypothesis of mindless chance processes 
entailed that it is impossible that cosmic environments are brought about to allow for biological 
evolution to occur and for organisms exhibit delicate adaptations, then a quick application of 
modus tollens would sweep that hypothesis from consideration by merely positing not-mindless 
chance.  However, it is not impossible that mindless chance processes should produce cosmic 
environments suitable for cosmic evolution and biological evolution to occur.  It is merely 
improbable that such conditions should be brought about.26  The manner in which Craig presents 
this argument has a hidden premise of induction or abduction.  The problem is that it is not clear.  
This hidden premise could be taken as induction or abduction and with no explication it weakens 
the case more than it already was by setting it up in a deductive manner. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 An abductive argument may appear in a deductive manner (i.e. disjunctive) but that does not 
necessitate that it is a deductive argument.  I am using the word ‘strict’ to indicate the difference between 
forming the abductive argument in a similar structure and an actual deductive argument. 
 
25 Design could be exchanged for fine-tuning.  William Lane Craig uses this form of the argument in 
Reasonable Faith Ed. 3 (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 161. 
 
26 Elliott Sober, “The Design Argument,” in God and Design Ed. Neil A. Manson (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 33. 
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B. The Problem of Induction 
For example27, it is possible to show that the series 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + … has a sum of n 
terms of n(n + 1)/2. First one must show that if it is true for n terms it must also be true for (n + 
1) terms.  According to the formula 
Sn = n(n + 1)/2 
if the formula is correct, the sum of (n +1) terms is obtained by adding (n +1) terms is obtained 
by adding (n + 1) to this 
Sn+1 = n(n + 1)/2 + (n +1) 
Sn+1 = n(n + 1)(n + 2)/2 
This agrees with the result obtained by replacing n in the general formula by (n + 1), i.e.: 
Sn+1 = n(n + 1)(n + 1 + 1)/2 
Sn+1 = n(n + 1)(n + 2)/2 
Thus, the formula is true for (n + 1) terms if it is true for n terms.  Therefore, if it is true for the 
sum to one term (n = 1), it must be true for the sum of two terms (n + 1). Likewise, if true for 
two terms, it must be true for three terms, and so on through all the values of n. It is easy to show 
that it is true for one term: 
Sn = (1 + 1)/2 
Sn = 1 
which is the first term in the series. Hence, the theorem is true for all integer values of n. 
In logic, induction takes individual instances and applies them to more general instances (or, 
particularly, taking an existential instantiation and turning that into a general instantiation), or 
from observed to unobserved ones.  Induction usually takes the form: F1 is A, F2 is A… Fn is A, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 This example can be found in John Daintith and John Clark’s The Facts on File Dictionary of 
Mathematics (New York: Market Book House, 1999), 96. 
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therefore all Fs are A (‘this swan has wings, that swan has wings… therefore all swans have 
wings’); or: all Fs observed so far are A. Unlike deduction, asserting the premises while denying 
the conclusion in an inductive argument does not lead to a contradiction.  The conclusion is not 
guaranteed to be true if the premises are true. 
Inductive logic, generally speaking, takes elements of a set and applies this subset of 
elements to a broader set.  More specifically, the principle of mathematical induction states that 
if zero has a property, P, and if whenever a number has the property its successor also has the 
property, then all numbers have the property:28 
(∀P)(((P(0)& (∀x)((x ∈ N & Px)→ (∀y)(y ∈ N→ Py))  
Induction works by enumeration: as support for the conclusion that all p’s are q’s, one could list 
many examples of p’s that are q’s.  It also includes an ampliative argument in which the 
premises, while not entailing the truth of the conclusion, nevertheless purport good reason for 
accepting it.29   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 A.D. Irvine, “The Philosophy of Logic” in Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2000), 13. 
 
29 Ibid., 389.  As I’ll note, one of the reasons why induction is supported entails a reason for why 
induction is weakened as an explanatory methodology. All induction problems may be phrased in a way 
that depicts a sequence of predictions.  Inductive problems will contain a previous indicator or explanans 
for the explanandum.  For instance, Carl Hempel’s example of Jones’ infection: 
 
p(R,S& P)
Sj& Pj
Rj  
 
Where j is Jones, p is the probability, Sj is Jones’ infection, Pj is he being treated with penicillin, and 
Rj is his recovery.  If the probability of observing R at any time given the past observations of S&P1… 
S&P2 … S&Pn (the probability of the set meeting R is m) where R was close to 1 then a predictive 
explanans (the S&Pn ) can be made for future instances of m using an inductive-statistical explanation.  
For if the probability m(S&Pn | S&P1… S&P2 …) is a computable function, the range of data is finite then 
a posterior predication M can be made from m.  M can be legitimately referred to as a universal predictor 
in cases of m. This is where Hempel rejects the requirement of maximal specificity (RMS), contra 
Rudolph Carnap, in which the RMS is a maxim for inductive logic that states that this is a necessary 
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 However, there is a great deal of problem for induction when applied to the fine-tuning 
argument.  The fine-tuning argument can be expressed inductively if the premises make the 
conclusion probable.  An inductive form of the argument typically appears somewhat similar to 
William Paley’s argument from design.   
1) Entity e in nature, or nature itself, is like specified human artifact a in relevant properties 
p. 
2) a has p precisely because it is a product of deliberate design by intelligent human agency. 
3) Like effects typically have like causes or like explanations. 
4) Therefore, it is probable that e has p precisely because it too is a product of deliberate 
design by intelligent, relevantly human-like agency.30 
This analogizes known instances of design, such as the design of a watch, a computer, or a light 
bulb, with the similarities of the natural phenomena to be explained (i.e. DNA, the function of 
certain equations, etc.). Expressed inductively, for every element in a set of properties in which 
these properties are compared to the properties of known and observed designs there is a subset 
of properties that have similar properties.  One of the problems is determining the line of 
demarcation between how many similarities warrant for concluding that there is design (or fine-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
condition for rationality of any given knowledge situation K.  Let K represent the set of data known in m.  
According to Hempel we cannot have all the material for K.  For any future time when the explanandum 
is in sync with the explanans of K, in this case, Rj, may be different when factoring different data at 
different times. It may be the case that future data that was impossible to consider may bring about ~Rj.  I 
believe Carnap’s RMS should be understood as a principle rather than an axiom for inductive logic.  It 
seems RMS is an attempt to make inductive arguments like deductive arguments.  So, instead of using M 
as a universal instantiation of future m, M may simply be a categorical similarity of m as a mere 
prediction and only a prediction because it is tentative to future variations of like-conditions in future 
explanandums.  I know Carnap would suggest that his system of inductive logic there can be a degree of 
confirmation of statements which assign an inductive probability to a hypothesis about a particular event 
relative to the evidence statements about other particular events and that no universal generalizations are 
involved. Carl G. Hempel, “Inductive-Statistical Explanation” in Philosophy of Science. Eds. Martin Curd 
and J.A. Cover (New York: Norton, 1998), 706-708. Marcus Hutter, “On the Existence and Convergence 
of Computable Universal Priors,” Technical Report 5 no. 3 (2003): 1-3. Wesley Salmon, “Hempel’s 
Conception of Inductive Inferences in Inductive-Statistical Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 44 no. 2 
(1977): 183.  
 
30 This is a similar to the form used by Del Ratzsch, “Teleological Arguments for God’s Existence” in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/teleological-arguments (accessed April 23, 2012). 
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tuning) and how much dissimilarity warrants not-design.  Additionally, there must be a 
distinction in what is the appropriate margin for categorizing a property as similar—this asks the 
question, “How similar are these properties?”—and the distinction for what property is 
dissimilar.  In known instances of design we can know that final causation has occurred when a 
light bulb is designed because it was evidently designed to fulfill the purpose of illumination.  In 
attempting to demonstrate final causation the inductive argument one must assume final 
causation if any criterion of ‘function’ is to be compared.  This problem is akin to the 
requirement of maximal specificity.  Though this does not completely eliminate the power of any 
fine-tuning argument, when it is formatted with the premises supporting the conclusion it is a 
weaker version for a historical method of inquiry. 
C. The Robustness of Abduction 
 An abductive argument for fine-tuning is very similar to induction. Rather than the 
premises adding to the probability of the conclusion the conclusion adds to the probability of the 
premises.  This is not to completely exclude the role of the premises adding to the probability of 
the conclusion but there is a greater emphasis of using the best explanation (the conclusion) to fit 
the data (the premises).  The belief in question is assessed as the consequent and then 
considering what may be the best explanation for that belief, antecedently.  This may seem 
fallacious but inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a commonly accepted form of reasoning.  
Additionally, this abductive process only comes into the process when assessing whether the 
evidence sufficiently corresponds to the belief since the belief typically arises by the antecedent 
evidence and then as the consequent, it is the assessment of the belief that requires working 
backwards. 
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 Such methods are derived from the use of abductive reasoning.  The American 
philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Peirce first described abduction.  He noted that, unlike 
inductive reasoning, in which a universal law or principle is established from repeated 
observations of the same phenomena, and unlike deductive reasoning, in which a particular fact 
is deduced by applying a general law to another particular fact or case, abductive reasoning 
infers unseen facts, events, or causes in the past from clues or facts in the present.31 Consider the 
following syllogism: 
1) If it rains, the streets will get wet. 
2) The streets are wet. 
3) Therefore, it rained. 
Here, the use of abductive reasoning may seem fallacious at first take.  This syllogism seems to 
commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.  One cannot deduce from the data, that the 
streets are wet, that it rained because there are many other explanations for why the streets are 
wet.  It could have been the case that a fire hydrant was allowed to flow, a street cleaner came 
through, a concerned citizen who wanted to clean the chalk off of the streets from the little 
children drawing pictures or writing words. There are many possibilities that could explain why 
the road was wet.  This was the problem posed before Peirce. How was it that despite the logical 
problem of affirming the consequent, one nevertheless frequently makes conclusive inferences 
about the past?  The key point is the explanatory scope and power of the explanation.  Abductive 
reasoning does not derive a certain conclusion (for one would then be guilty of affirming the 
consequent), but it makes an inference to the best explanation.  Peirce’s example was whether 
anyone should believe in the existence of Napoleon.  He claimed that the past may be inferred 
from the study of present effects, namely, artifacts and records.  Peirce concluded, “Though we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 In the words of Stephen C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell (New York:  Harper Collins, 2009), 153.  
Charles Peirce, Collected Papers, 2:375; “Abduction and Induction.” 
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have not seen the man [Napoleon], yet we cannot explain what we have seen without the 
hypothesis of his existence.”32  Despite the apparent fallacy, W.P. Alston, W.B. Gallie, and 
Michael Scriven have observed, such arguments can be restated in a logically acceptable form if 
it can be shown that Y has only one cause (i.e. X) or that X is a necessary condition (or cause) of 
Y.  Thus, arguments of the form: 
1) X is antecedently necessary to Y, 
2) Y exists, 
3) Therefore, X existed. 
are logically valid by philosophers and persuasive by historical and forensic scientists.33 
Its application to this case is that a particular abductive hypothesis can be firmly established if it 
can be shown that it represents the best or only explanation of the “manifest effects” in 
question.34  Whatever the best explanation is it cannot be contrived ad hoc or post hoc but must 
be related to the evidence and must follow from the evidence.  Abduction allows for a powerful 
predictive capability.  Abductive reasoning allows for the positing of the best explanation, which 
may lie beyond, external to, the data.  The conclusion does not rest in any of the premises. 
 This is a non-controversial use of reasoning.  Many inferences are naturally described in 
this way.  Charles Darwin inferred the hypothesis of natural selection because although his 
biological evidence did not entail it, natural selection would provide the best explanation of that 
evidence.  Astronomers use abduction when they infer that a galaxy is receding from the Earth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Abduction and Induction” in The Philosophy of Pierce, Ed. J. Buchler 
(London: Routledge, 1956), 375. 
 
33 Stephen C. Meyer, “A Scientific History—and Philosophical Defense—of the Theory of Intelligent 
Design.” W. P. Alston, “The Place of the Explanation of Particular Facts in Science,” Philosophy of 
Science 38 (1971):  13-34.  W. B. Gallie, “Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences” in Theories 
of History:  Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 386-
402. Michael Scriven, “Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory,” Science 130 (1959):  477-
482. 
 
34 Meyer, Signature in the Cell, 154. 
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with a certain velocity because the recession would be the best explanation of the redshift the 
light from the galaxy emits.35  Inference to the best explanation is in close contact with the 
holistic view of explanation.36  Philip Kitcher argued that this holistic view of inferential 
reasoning 
[h]olds that [scientific] understanding increases as we decrease the number of 
independent assumptions that are required to explain what goes on in the world… 
Explanations serve to organize and systematize our knowledge in the most efficient and 
coherent possible fashion.  Understanding, on this view, involves having a world-
picture—a scientific Weltanschauung—and seeing how various aspects of the world and 
our experience of it fit into that picture.37 
II. The Role of Probability 
 The most common way to connect confirmation with probability is by adopting the 
relevance criterion of confirmation, according to which a piece of evidence, e, confirms a 
hypothesis, h, if and only if e raises the probability of h: 
e confirms h if and only if P(h|e) > P(h); 
e disconfirms h if and only if P(h|e) < P(h).38 
In other words, whenever we are considering two competing hypotheses, an observation counts 
as evidence in favor of the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability.39 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Peter Lipton, “Abduction,” in The Philosophy of Science, Eds. Sahorta Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 1. 
 
36 Philip Clayton, “Inference to the Best Explanation,” Zygon 32 no. 3 (1997): 387. 
 
37 Philip Kitcher, “Scientific Explanation,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1989): 
182. 
38 Curd and Cover, 627. 
 
39 Sometimes the relevance criterion of confirmation is referred to as the prince principle of 
confirmation or the likelihood principle.  Let h1 and h2 be two be competing hypothesis (in this case the 
existence of X and ~X, with X being a first cause, fine-tuner, etc.).  According to the relevance criterion 
of confirmation, an observation e counts as evidence in favor of hypothesis h1 over h2 if the observation is 
more probable under h1 than h2.  Thus, e counts in favor of h1 over h2 if P(e|h1) > P(e|h2), where P(e|h1) 
and P(e|h2) depict a conditional probability of e on h1 and h2, respectively.  The degree to which the 
evidence counts in favor of one hypothesis over another is proportional to the degree to which e is more 
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For example, complex and specified information (e) confirms the hypothesis that a fine-tuner 
exists (h) if and only if it is more probable that a fine-tuner exists given complex and specified 
information over the probability of the mere existence of a fine-tuner. 
This principle is sound under all interpretations of probability.  The relative criterion of 
confirmation can be derived from the so-called odds form of Bayes’ Theorem, which also allows 
one to give a precise statement to the degree to which evidence counts in favor of one hypothesis 
over another.  The odds form of Bayes’ Theorem is:40 
P(h1|e)/P(h2|e) = [P(h1)/P(h2)] x [P(e|h1)/P(e|h2)] 
Whenever probability is being considered there must be some type of relevant or total 
background information (usually depicted as k).  In the final form of the argument the 
background information will be represented as k’, which excludes arguments for the existence of 
God.  Since this argument cannot render the conclusion that God exists such arguments should 
not be considered relevant to the probability calculus. 
 A problem that is often raised when using the relevance criterion of confirmation or 
Bayesian-type analysis is that if evidence e is included in the background information k, then 
even if a hypothesis h entails e, it cannot confirm h since P(e|k & h) = P(e|k & ~h).41 For 
instance, if k includes evidence e that we exist then it would certainly be the case that h entails e. 
However, as previously noted, if k’ = k – {e} then k’ must denote a background information that 
excludes all arguments for the existence of God and types of anthropic arguments. For instance, 
if k’ were to include e such that e was a cosmological argument from contingency then the total 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
probable under h1 than h2: particularly, it is proportional to P(e|h1)/P(e|h2) . Collins, “The Teleological 
Argument,” 205. 
 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Ibid., 241. 
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background knowledge will be exponentially increased since the first uncaused caused will 
increase the probability of an antecedent mind responsible fro the fine-tuning of physics. 
Concerning anthropic arguments, k’ should not include the datum that we exist since it would 
then entail that LPU.42 This problem of old evidence appears in a more simplified scenario: given 
a certain characterization of background information B, the objective value of P(E|B) must 
always be 1. Since B includes all the details about the experimental setup and the instruments 
used to observe E, the objective probability that B will occur under those conditions (assuming 
that the system in question is deterministic) is 1.43 
 An immediate objection when applying a probability rule or calculus to the fine-tuning 
argument states that we do not have an appropriate random sampling.  In other words, if we 
know of only one universe the random sample size is precisely 1; thus, no random sample can be 
used to assess the probability of certain values of physics in the argument.  In statistics a random 
sample drawn must have the same chance of being sampled as all the other samples.  Since we 
know of only one universe we do not know what the range of values for the constants and 
physics could be.  Additionally, since we do not know how narrow or broad these ranges could 
be there is no way of drawing out any probability based argument from fine-tuning.  However, 
we can know what other universes would be like if the values were different.  If our natural laws 
have counterfactuals that are in any way coherent then this is an appropriate sampling.  Also, to 
make this objection and advocate that we just so happen to live in a life permitting universe in 
the multiverse then this objection cannot be made since the claim that we happen to life in a life-
permitting one amongst countless others suggest we can know what the other samplings are.  For !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Ibid. 
 
43 Martin Curd and J.A. Cover, “The Expectedness of Evidence,” Philosophy of Science Eds. Martin 
Curd and J.A. Cover (New York: Norton, 1998), 643. 
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instance, if the strong nuclear force were any stronger the universe would be composed of only 
hydrogen and if gravity were any weaker stars could never form to create the heavier elements.  
If these counterfactuals are coherent and are possible then we can draw an appropriate random 
sample.  Also, note that we do not have to know how narrow or broad the range of values could 
be.  That does not matter.  It could be very narrow or extremely broad and this sampling would 
still be appropriate.44  Thus, by virtue of the possible counterfactual expressions of the values of 
the laws of nature I believe we can make an appropriate probability based abductive argument 
for FT. 
III. Duhemian Science and Methodological Naturalism 
 When considering the use of abductive reasoning in science there is an assumption, or 
suppressed premise, of scientific realism or critical realism.  The limits of observation are a 
subject for empirical science, and not for philosophical analysis.45  Thus, a theory is empirically 
adequate if and only if what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true.  
This methodology does not negatively affect the conclusion for the fine-tuning argument either.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 What may be argued for is the mechanism that produces these random constants.  This mechanism 
would be superstring theory or M-theory.  Even though there may be a huge number of possible universes 
lying within the life-permitting universe, region of the cosmic landscape, nevertheless that life-permitting 
region will be unfathomably tiny compared to the entire landscape. This also shows that the physical 
universe itself is not unique.  The physical universe does not have to be the way it is:  it could be been 
otherwise functioning under different laws. Paul Davies, The Mind of God (New York:  Simon & 
Schulster, 1992), 169.  Davies means the laws of physics within the actual values of the constants, not 
confusing there being different values of the constants with there being different laws. Although some of 
the laws of physics can vary from universe to universe in M-theory, these fundamental laws and 
principles underlie M-theory and therefore cannot be explained as a multiverse selection effect. Further, 
since the variation among universes would consist of variation of the masses, and types of particles and 
the form of the forces between them, complex structures would almost certainly not be atomlike and 
stable energy sources would almost certainly require aggregates of matter.  Thus, the said fundamental 
laws seems necessary for there to be life in any of the many universes, not merely in a universe with our 
specific types of particles and forces. Collins, “The Teleological Argument,” 277. 
45 Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 56. 
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The conclusion itself may be contested but this methodology may certainly be compatible with a 
realist empirical methodology (a la Darwin). 
 The French philosopher Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) was a prominent contributor to the 
realist and anti-realist debate who served as a catalyst for the future development of constructive 
empiricism (CE), form of anti-realism or critical non-realism.  Duhem argued that scientific 
theories cannot be taken as literal descriptions of reality because theoretical descriptions are 
idealized in a way that the world is not.46 
 Empiricism set limits on what one is rationally obligated to believe.  There is no 
commitment, under CE, to believe the truth of the theory but one can accept the empirical data.  
This is very modest in its commitment to the informative power of a theory.  If one chooses an 
informative theory over a less committal counterpart then it can only be for pragmatic reasons 
and not because these theories are more likely to be true. According to CE, scientists need never 
accept the need to postpone theories [due to the need of more evidence] or use inferential 
methods such as abduction as forcing them to go beyond the limits of observation.  The 
explanation of the data can never have a legitimate inference to the best explanation outside of 
the evidence.   
 Duhem also stripped any explanation metaphysical import from explanatory hypotheses.  
This meant the removal of agent causation from acceptable scientific data and since his 
methodology does not allow for the explanation to go beyond the data, contra abduction, agency 
was not permitted as a viable scientific explanation.  If the aim of a physical theory is to explain 
phenomena in terms of the ultimate nature of their causes then physical science becomes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 A.F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science? Ed. 3 (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999), 241-
42. 
! 29!
subordinate to metaphysics and is no longer an autonomous science.47  Due to the very nature of 
this approach it entailed methodological naturalism, which is only allowing physical entities to 
be considered scientific.  
 Realism holds the position that observable and unobservable entities actually exist.  
Mathematical theories can provide direct insight to the nature of reality.  Anti-realism merely 
suits the data by positing an explanation but does not really say anything about how the world 
really is.  Examining the scientific validity of certain types of theories, in particular multiverse 
scenarios, and assessing what those theories might imply for the nature of reality, is one in which 
one’s philosophical approach leads to considerably different conclusions.48  As previously noted, 
I am approaching science as a realist.  If these multiverse scenarios are actually true then they 
accurately describe the physical reality. 
Using theoretical entities (i.e. a mind) in any justificatory capacity for knowledge seems 
to fall short on W.V.O. Quine’s naturalized epistemology (akin to Duhem’s methodology).  I 
think Quine does well in pointing out the problem with justificatory criteria for logical positivists 
but I do not think he offers a plausible solution.  Additionally, it is difficult consider Quine as an 
empiricist by his denial of the two central dogmas: the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements and the distinction between empirical content and logical form for statements.  The 
Quinian holistic approach of meaning applies to the meaning of a theory’s terms given by their 
place or role in a theory.  Then there is not a mere philosophical explanation for 
underdetermination but a philosophical foundation for incommensurability as well.  Everything 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 J.P. Moreland, “The Physical Sciences, Neuroscience, and Dualism,” in The Nature of Nature, 843. 
 
48 Brian Greene, The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and The Deep Laws of The Cosmos (New 
York: Knopf, 2011), 168. 
! 30!
was contained within a theory; it was completely autonomous.  Observation was used by Quine 
to for pragmatic purposes that retained for science its claims of objectivity.49 
Quine simply wants to treat theoretical entities as objects of perception but only in the 
pragmatic holistic fashion. Observation becomes empirical content as well as intersubjective 
checkpoints in science. Hypotheses imply observation categoricals.  These are generalized 
conditionals of observation sentences (i.e. Whenever there is an apple then it is red)—the 
rejection of existential instantiation.50 (This is where CE works best with a naturalized 
epistemology.  Scientific and epistemic direct realism are compatible but are less pragmatic or 
tentative.) 
 The reason why Duhem’s methodology should be rejected is because of the robust 
explanatory power of realism and abduction as well as the legitimacy of agency in a scientific 
hypothesis.  This scientific methodology is known as Augustinian science, after St. Augustine.  
The Augustinian approach to science eschews methodological naturalism and employs religious 
or metaphysical commitments.51  One need not import any religious commitments to the fine-
tuning argument.  However, the argument does require the metaphysical commitment to agency. 
Also, note that the argument still works given a CE approach. A stronger case for FT can be 
made using Augustinian science but the FT argument can stand on common ground of Duhem if 
need be given CE and the treatment of theoretical entities (mind) as pragmatic tools. Agency, or 
mind, is important since it will serve as the explanation for the origin of information in the 
universe, which will be discussed in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE MULTIVERSE HYPOTHESIS 
I. The Historical Development 
 In this section I will trace the history of the multiverse hypothesis, as depicted in its 
contemporary understanding,52 to demonstrate that the multiverse is not ad hoc conjecture and 
that there is a strong scientific and philosophical basis for postulating many universes. In 1956 
Hugh Everett III published his Ph.D. dissertation titled “The Theory of the Universal Wave 
Function.”  In this paper Everett argued for the relative state formulation of quantum theory and 
a quantum philosophy, which denied wave collapse.  Initially, this interpretation was highly 
criticized by the physics community and when Everett visited Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in 1959 
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52 The idea of many universes traces back much further than Hugh Everett to the Pre-Socratics. They 
were known as the sophos (the wise ones).  They were eclipsed by the British and German philosophers 
of science in the seventeenth century and were largely disconnected from science henceforth. Science sets 
the agenda, but philosophers bring philosophical reasons instead of scientific reasons.  Science answers 
the questions. The Pre-Socratics were the first to deal with metaphysics and did so to provide a rational 
philosophy.  This allowed for a rational and objective observation and the use of reason to systematize 
and order the content to make it coherent. 
The Sophists were worldly-wise in contrast with the sophos–frustrated by the plurality of answers in 
the current philosophy. The Sophists were the original skeptics as evidenced in Pyrrho. They came out of 
the sixth century BC and broke away from religious dogma, which had never happened before.  Their 
methods were pragmatic and subjective–rhetorical and fashionable.  The phrase, “The One and the Many” 
became important.  The One (reality) had everything related to it (Many).  This is where we get Monism–
the quality of oneness.  We see Monism appear later in Leibniz’s monads, which take us to a single 
substance and leads to atomic theory. 
Ionian cosmology picked up the discourse. The poet Hesiod promoted a moral consistency with the 
gods and the Milesians used this as the next step of consistency to get to the natural order. Thales (624-
546 BC) is often referred to as the first philosopher when he predicted an eclipse of the sun.  This was the 
first step in the evolution of metaphysical discovery. (Thales’ theorem postulated that if angles A and C 
were the diameter of a circle then angle B was a right angle.)  The world was rational and could be 
predicted and ordered. 
Anaximander (611-547 BC) was Thales’ pupil.  The Aperion was considered to be the intermediate 
boundaries of the heavens.  Reality must be more fundamental than water (a la Thales).  The Apeiron was 
in eternal motion.  Anaximander postulated many universes. Universes are always in the mode of creation 
and destruction. This was very naturalistic–the universe was its own cause.  It was through Anaximander 
we first see the theory of evolution. The Earth was believed to be a cylindrical column. Since it’s on the 
center it does not fall.  This principle was applied to matter.  Democritus took these principles and applied 
it to the atom itself.  Democritus believed there we an infinite number of universes being created and 
being destroyed at every moment. 
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Bohr was unimpressed with Everett’s most recent development.53 In 1957 Everett coined his 
theory as the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics.  In an attempt to 
circumvent the problem of defining the mechanism for the state of collapse Everett suggested 
that all orthogonal relative states are equally valid ontologically.54  What this means is that all-
possible states are true and exist simultaneously. 
Everett left the field of pure physics and went on to work for the Department of Defense 
until is untimely death in 1982. Since his seminal work many have had their reserves due to the 
mere weirdness. B.S. DeWitt, whose work was critical for Everett, stated, 
[I] still recall vividly the shock I experienced on first encountering this multiworld 
concept.  The idea of 10100 slightly imperfect copies of oneself all constantly spitting into 
further copies, which ultimately become unrecognizable, is not easy to reconcile with 
common sense.  Here is schizophrenia with a vengeance.55 
However, there are still those who find the interpretation attractive. The Oxford philosopher 
David Wallace puts it this way: 
[I]n recent work on the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics, it 
has increasingly been recognized that any version of the interpretation worth defending 
will be one in which the basic formalism of quantum mechanics is left unchanged.  
Properties such as the interpretation of the wave-function as describing a multiverse of 
branching worlds, or the ascription of probabilities to the branching events, must be 
emergent from the unitary quantum mechanics rather than added explicitly to the 
mathematics.56 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Jonathan Allday, Quantum Reality: Theory and Philosophy (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, 
2009), 439. 
 
54 An orthogonal state is one that is mutually exclusive.  A system cannot be in two orthogonal states 
at the same time.  As a result of the measurement interaction, the states of the observer have evolved into 
exclusive states precisely linked to the results of the measurement.  At the end of the measurement 
process the state of the observer is the sum of eigenstate—or a combination of the sums of eigenstates, 
one sum for each possible value of the eigenvalue.  Each sum is the relative state of the observer given the 
value of the eigenvalue. Allday, 442-43. 
 
55 Quoted in Allday, 455. 
 
56 David Wallace, “Everettian Rationality: Defending Deutsch’s Approach to Probability in the 
Everett Interpretation,” arXiv:quant-ph/0303050v2 (Mar. 2003): 1. 
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MWI was initially attractive, and still is, due to its appeasement of objectivity. There are no 
logical holes in the mathematics. It has recently gained greater popularity due to its present and 
greatest advocate Max Tegmark. In the following sections I will explicate Tegmark’s categories 
of the multiverse and how these specifically relate to the issue of fine-tuning. 
II. Max Tegmark’s Hierarchy 
 Contemporary physics seem to indicate that there are good reasons, theoretically and 
physically, for an idea that there is a plurality of worlds.  This concept has come to be understood 
as the multiverse.  The multiverse is not monolithic but it is modeled after the contemporary 
understanding of an inflationary model of the beginning of this universe.  Max Tegmark has 
championed the most prominent four-way distinction of the multiverse.57 
 Tegmark’s first version of the multiverse is called the level one multiverse.  The level one 
is, for the most part, more space beyond the observable universe.  So, theoretically, if we were to 
go to the “edge” of the universe there would be more space.  Having this model as a version of 
the multiverse may be misleading because there is still only one volume, landscape, or system 
involved.  A generic prediction of cosmological inflation is an infinite space, which contains 
Hubble volumes (what we see in our universe) realizing in all conditions—including an identical 
copy of each of us about 101029  meters away.58 
 The level two multiverse is typically associated with other bubble universes spawning 
from a cosmic landscape and inflation.  This version predicts that different regions of space can 
exhibit different laws of physics (physical constants, dimensionality, particle content, etc.) 
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57 Tegmark, “The Multiverse Hierarchy.” 
 
58 When Tegmark refers to an “identical” copy he simply refers to a similar copy.  There is a genuine 
ontological distinction.  Ibid., 2. 
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corresponding to different localities and a landscape of possibilities.59  Imagine the multiverse as 
a bathtub filled with tiny bubbles.  Each bubble in this larger system (the bathtub) is a single 
universe.  Or, imagine a pot of boiling water.  The bubbles arise from the bottom of the pot 
analogous to the way inflationary cosmology works.  These other domains (or bubble universes) 
are nearly infinitely far away in the sense that we could never get there even if we traveled faster 
than the speed of light (due to the constant stretching of space and creation of more volume).60  It 
may, however, not be the case that there is an infinite set of universes.  Andrei Linde and Vitaly 
Vanchurin have argued that the way slow-roll inflation works it could only produce a finite 
number of universes.  Hence, they propose that there are approximately 101010
7 !universes.61 
 The level three multiverse is particular to certain interpretations of quantum mechanics 
such as Hugh Everett’s Many Worlds Interpretation.  It is a mathematically simple model in 
support of unitary physics.  Everything that can happen in the particle realm actually does 
happen.  Observers would only view their level one multiverse, but the process of decoherence—
which mimics wave function collapse while preserving unitary physics—prevents them from 
seeing the level three parallel copies of themselves.62 
 The fourth level is the all-encompassing version where mathematical existence is 
equivalent to physical existence.  Mathematical structures are physically real and the entire 
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59 Ibid. 
 
60 Ibid., 7.  Additionally, there has been good scientific evidence suggesting observational grounds for 
inflation.  Researchers have taken the 7-year WMAP data and applied certain algorithms to pick up traces 
of thermal fluctuations in the early universe.  What they found were traces of what could be bubble 
collisions of the edges of our universe with another universe.  Stephen Feeney, et al., “First Observational 
Tests of Eternal Inflation:  Analysis Methods and WMAP 7-year Results,” arXiv:1012.3667v2 (July 
2011). 
 
61 Linde and Vanchurin, 10. 
 
62 Tegmark, “The Multiverse Hierarchy, ”10. 
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human language we use to describe it is merely a useful approximation for describing our 
subjective perceptions.  Other mathematical structures give different fundamental equations of 
physics for every region of reality.63  This would be Plato’s ideal reality. 
 What is most important about having this scientific evidence is that it provides us with 
reasonable evidence to support the idea of modal realism.  Modal realism cannot simply be 
brushed off anymore as being incoherent and baseless whereas this evidence may be an example 
of when purely mathematical, scientific, and philosophical theories may have physical support.  
Additionally, each version of the multiverse allows for modal realism to be true.64 The following 
sections will examine the cosmogony of different levels and versions of the multiverse. 
III. Inflationary Cosmology 
 Inflationary cosmology typically refers to L1M and L2M. This will be important when 
considering the variation of values for physical constants. The properties of our universe appear 
to be finely-tuned for the existence of life.  Cosmologists would like to explain the numbers and 
values that describe these properties we observe.  Their attempt is to show that these constants 
and values in nature are completely determined as a product of inflation.65   
 The eternally inflating multiverse is often used to provide a consistent framework to 
understand coincidences and fine-tuning in the universe we inhabit.66  This theory primarily 
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63 Ibid., 2, 12-13. 
 
64 Whether Linde and Vanchurin are correct in their finite version of the multiverse or whether 
Tegmark is correct is irrelevant to modal realism.  All that is required is that there be a time at which all 
possible states of affairs do occur—all events must not be simultaneous for modal realism to work. 
However, I am not necessarily arguing that the multiverse and modal realism are actually true. 
 
65 John D. Barrow, The Constants of Nature: The Numbers Encode the Deepest Secrets of the 
Universe (New York: Random House, 2003), 182. 
 
66 Alan Guth and Yasunori Nomura, “What Can the Observation of Nonzero Curvature Tell Us?” 
arXiv:1203.6876v2, (July 2012): 32. 
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appears several forms, which attempt to explain the mechanism that drives the rapid expansion 
of the universe.  Before developing these models there are a few basic premises that must be 
agreed upon: the size of the universe, the Hubble expansion, homogeny and isotropy, and the 
flatness problem. 
 It is unanimously agreed upon that the Hubble volume we inhabit is incredibly large.  
According to standard Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FRW) cosmology, without 
inflation, one simply postulates 1090 elementary particles.67  This number is derived from simply 
geometrical quantitative measurements.  One of the tasks at hand is explaining how the universe 
got so big.  The exponential expansion of inflation reduces the problem of explaining 1090 
particles to the problem of explaining 60 or 70 e-foldings of inflation.68 Inflationary cosmology 
therefore suggests that, even though the observed universe is incredibly large, it is only an 
infinitesimal fraction of the entire multiverse.69 
 The Hubble expansion serves as a factor in the initial conditions of the universe. In the 
1920’s Edwin Hubble was studying the Andromeda nebula.  At least since the time of Immanuel 
Kant, scientists wondered what these distant enormous objects were (galaxies). With further 
study, Hubble noticed that these galaxies had a red shift; the galaxies were appearing redder than 
they should have and Hubble postulated that these galaxies were moving away from one another.  
What was being observed was the same thing that the Doppler effect has on sound.  The 
trajectory of an object has an effect on the wavelength of the sound, or in this case, light. If this 
expansion is extrapolated the equations of motion then (and even now) can only go but so far—
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68 E-foldings are time measurements, which serve as intervals between the exponential growth of a 
quantity or volume by the factor of e. 
 
69 Ibid. 
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until the universe comes to a singularity.  Inflation actually offers the possibility of explaining 
how this expansion initially began. The repulsive gravity associated with the false vacuum is 
what contributes to the explanation.  The false vacuum energy density is the exact kind of force 
needed to propel the universe into a pattern of motion in which any two particles are moving 
apart wit ha velocity proportional in their separation.70 
 Homogeneity and isotropy refers to the uniformity of the universe. This can be seen in 
the below image of the Planck Satellite one-year survey results. 
Fig. 5.1 
 
The intensity of the cosmic background radiation is the same in all directions. It is calculated to 
the incredible precision of one part in 100,000 and possibly even greater precision with 
developing Planck Survey results.71  In standard FRW cosmology, the uniformity could be 
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71 This all-sky image shows the distribution of the Galactic Haze seen by ESA's Planck mission at 
microwave frequencies superimposed over the high-energy sky as seen by NASA's Fermi Gamma-ray 
Space Telescope. The Planck data (shown here in red and yellow) correspond to the Haze emission at 
frequencies of 30 and 44 GHz, extending from and around the Galactic Centre. The Fermi data (shown 
here in blue) correspond to observations performed at energies between 10 and 100 GeV and reveal two 
bubble-shaped, gamma-ray emitting structures extending from the Galactic Centre. This becomes 
important in next chapter.  It has been posited that these bubbles in the data may in fact be the result of an 
early universe collision with another universe’s bubble. ESA/Planck and NASA/DOE/Fermi LAT/Dobler 
et al./Su et al. http://sci.esa.int/science-e/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=50008 (accessed May 6, 
2012). P.A.R. Ade, et al, “Planck Early Results. I. The Planck Mission,” arXiv: 1101.2022v2 (June 2011). 
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established so quickly only if information could propagate 100 times the speed of light, a 
propositions clearly contradicting known physics.  However, in inflationary cosmology, the 
uniformity is easily explained by the creation of uniformity on microscopic scales via normal 
thermal-equilibrium processes. Inflation then takes over and stretches the regions of uniformity 
to become large enough to encompass the observed universe.72 
Fig. 5.273 
 
 The flatness problem is related to the precision required for the initial value of Ω, the 
ratio of the actual mass density to the critical mass density. This occurred when Robert Dicke 
and P.J.E. Peebles pointed out that at t = 1 second after the big bang nucleosynthesis were just 
beginning, Ωtot (total) must have equaled one to an accuracy of one part in 1015. If this ratio were 
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not accurate to this degree the resulting universe would not resemble our own.74As depicted in 
figure 5.2 the evolution of the universe differs between inflation scenarios and FRW scenarios. 
The standard FRW cosmology does not have an explanation for the Ω value while inflation does. 
 Magnetic monopoles are extremely massive particles carrying a net magnetic charge, 
which is a result of predictions made by all the grand unified theories.  By combining the grand 
unified theories with non-inflation scenarios the expected age of the universe is no longer 13.73 
billion years old but it becomes about 30,000 years old.75  Inflation eliminates these monopoles 
by arranging the parameters so that inflation takes place after or during monopole production, so 
the monopole density is diluted to a completely negligible level.76 
Fig. 5.377 
 
 These preliminaries for inflation will help understand what exactly inflation accomplishes 
and what it predicts.  Sometime between 1983-1986 Andrei Linde developed and proposed a 
model of eternal chaotic inflation, for which the energy density, with the initial randomly chosen 
value of the fields corresponds to a point hill, contra a Mexican hat with a bowl shape, then 
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sufficient inflation can occur as the fields roll towards the state of minimum energy density.78 
Consider the evolution of the scalar field below: 
Fig. 5.479 
 
 
As depicted in figure 5.3 the evolution of the scalar field leads to many inflationary domains as 
revealed in this computer-generated depiction.  In most parts of the universe, the scalar field 
decreases (the depressions and the valleys).  In other places quantum fluctuations cause the 
scalar field to augment.  In those places, represented as peaks, the universe undergoes inflation 
and rapidly expands, leading to the creation of inflationary regions. Our Hubble volume is in one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Guth, The Inflationary Universe, 327. 
 
79 Linde, “The Self-Reproducing Universe,” 50-51. 
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of the valleys, where space is no longer inflating.80 Each of these peaks consists in large 
domains, which have different laws of physics (represented by the different colors in figure 5.5 
below).81  Sharp peaks are big bangs; their heights correspond to the energy density of the 
universe there.  At the top of the peaks, the colors rapidly fluctuate, indicating that the laws of 
physics there are not yet settled.  They become fixed only in the valleys, one of which 
corresponds to the universe we live in now.82 
Fig. 5.583 
 
 Due to the nature of inflation each valley produces a universe with different values, 
which is a prediction of quantum cosmology.  Inflation is not a monolithic in form (eternal, 
chaotic, new, string, etc.); however, each model has the basic premise as described above.  Not 
only does inflation have scientific attraction for conforming observations, theory, and data but 
yields a philosophical satisfaction in attempting to explain away fine-tuning. In the standard !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Ibid. 
 
81 This would be the same space where the Coleman and De Luccia instanton functions, which allows 
for vacua decay via bubble nucleation (of a bubble universe). Michael P. Salem, “Bubble Collisions and 
Measures of the Multiverse.” arXiv:1108.0040v2 (Dec. 2011), 2. 
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FRW big bang model inflationists see fine-tuning as ‘ugly.’  The claim is that the need for such 
fine-tuning of the initial state is removed in the inflationary picture, and this is regarded as a 
more aesthetically pleasing physical picture.84  Additionally, if inflation is true then there is not 
one universe but a multiverse, potentially infinite in number.85 
IV. String Theory 
 Just as inflationary cosmology refers to L1M and the L2M string theory refers to L3M 
and L4M, which encompasses L1M and L2M as well. The spontaneous breakdown of 
symmetries86 in the early universe can produce linear discontinuities in fields, known as cosmic 
strings.  Cosmic strings are also common in modern string theories in which the most 
fundamental reality are astronomically tiny vibrating strings (either closed or open depending on 
the interpretation of the mathematics).87  The combination of the string/scalar landscape with 
eternal inflation has in turn led to a markedly increased interest in anthropic reasoning.  In this 
multiverse scenario life will evolve only in very rare regions where the local laws of physics just 
happen to have the properties needed for life, giving a simple explanation for why the observed 
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85 Referring back to chapter two, multiverse scenarios can quantify individual universes as an actual 
infinite set or finite in number with universes continuously being created adding to the total number—
thus potentially infinite. 
 
86 This refers to the symmetry of particles.  For every particle there is a corresponding symmetric 
particle.  Physics has a translational symmetry, which means that the laws and values of physics are the 
same at every location in the universe.  If an observer were to travel from one point to a much farther 
distant point the observer we see no change in the physics.  A broken symmetry introduces change—a 
non-absolute uniformity.  The breaking of symmetries creates complexity in the laws of nature in the 
outcome of laws.  There is a symmetry and uniformity between the strong and weak nuclear forces, which 
have been unified as electromagnetism by James Clerk Maxwell.  A typical example of vital symmetry 
breaking is that which gives rise to the balance between matter and antimatter in the early universe.  
However, there is an asymmetry between the quantum and the large (a la gravity). String theory is the 
attempt to unify all of physics. Barrow, The Constants of Nature, 282-84. 
 
87 Edmund J. Copeland, Robert C. Myers, and Joseph Polchinski, “Cosmic F- and D-Strings,” Cornell 
University Library arXiv: hep-th/0312067v5 (May 2004): 1-3. 
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universe appears to permit the evolutionary conditions for life.  It is argued that such anthropic 
reasoning can give the illusion of intelligent design without the need for any intelligent 
intervention.88  There are at least four ways we can understand the different universes described 
by string landscape.89 
 The first version depicts various universes as simply occupying different regions of 
space.  This is most simply realized in chaotic inflation.  Inflation fields do not vanish but 
different universes are created in different parts of the universe/multiverse.90  The scalar fields in 
different inflating patches may take different values, giving rise to different values for various 
effective coupling constants.  The second version describes universes as different eras of time in 
a single big bang.  What appear to be constants might actually depend on scalar fields that 
change slowly as the universe expands.91 The third version depicts universes as different regions 
of spacetime.  This can happen if various scalar fields on which the constants of nature depend 
change in a sequence of first-order phase transitions.92  In these transitions meta-stable bubbles 
form within a region of higher vacuum energy and in these bubbles there are bubble that form 
with a lower vacuum energy.93  It has been suggested that in this scenario the geometry of the 
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universe is small for anthropic reasons and possibly large enough to be detected.94 The final 
version treats the universes as wave functions (a part of quantum mechanical Hilbert space), 
which lead to superpositions of wave functions in which any coupling constant not constrained 
by symmetry principles would take any possible value. Stephen Hawking argues that a simple 
“minisuperspace” model this boundary condition leads to a wave function, which can be 
interpreted as a superposition of quantum states, which are peaked around a family of classical 
solutions of the field equations. These solutions are non-singular and represent oscillating 
universes with a long inflationary period. They could be a good description of the observed 
universe.95 
V. Anthropic Reasoning in Multiverse Scenarios 
 In order to invoke multiverse scenarios as a means of avoiding the problems of fine-
tuning it is the hope for the objector to FT that the larger the number of possible values of 
physical parameters provided by the string landscape, the more string theory legitimates 
anthropic reasoning as a new basis for physical theories.96  Not only does this become a physical 
theory but a metaphysical theory. Roughly speaking, the anthropic argument takes as its starting 
point the fact that the universe we perceive about us must be of such a nature as will produce and 
accommodate the existence of the observers who can perceive it.97 
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 Traditionally there are two forms:98 the weak (WAP) and the strong (SAP).  The WAP is 
a reflective and happenstantial inquiry: The observed values of all physical and cosmological 
quantities are not equally probably but they take on values restricted by the requirement that 
there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the universe be 
old enough for it to have already done so.99  The SAP is much more problematic: rather than 
considering just one universe we envisage an ensemble of possible universes—among which the 
fundamental constants of nature vary. Sentient beings must find themselves to be located in a 
universe where the constants of nature (in addition to the spatiotemporal location) are 
congenial.100  There is another anthropic principle Tegmark introduces specifically related to 
multiverse scenarios—the minimalistic anthropic principle (MAP). Tegmark believes the 
anthropic principle has generated more heat than light with so many different interpretations. 
MAP states that when testing fundamental theories with observational data, ignoring selection 
effects can give incorrect conclusions.101 My response to MAP will be in Chapter 5 on whether 
selection effects are sufficient explanations for what we observe. 
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Fig. 5.6102 
 
 John Barrow and Frank Tipler have three different interpretations for the SAP: 1) There 
exists one possible universe designed with the goal of generating and sustaining observers; 2) 
observers are necessary to bring the universe into being; and 3) An ensemble of other different 
universes is necessary for the existence of our universe. The ~FT starts with the universe or 
environment and argues that life evolved to be compatible with the environment (either WAP or 
SAP).  The WAP does not seem to have any explanatory hypothesis over the actual values and 
existence of the universe we find ourselves in.  It is useful for noting whether the laws of physics 
have changed in our lifetime.  Obviously, if it changed then we would not be here to observe it.  
WAP becomes abused when it is treated as an explanatory hypothesis to account for fine-tuning.   
The FT starts with life and looks at all the sufficient and necessary conditions that are 
required for life to exist.  These conditions are considered to be the fine-tuning data. Therefore, 
the FT will adopt the SAP1 interpretation.  
 Physicist Victor Stenger advocates the multiverse as an explanatory hypothesis to 
account for the anthropic principle; thus, adopting SAP3. He offers one possible natural 
explanation for the anthropic coincidences being that multiple universes exist with different 
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102 Let universe on the left depict the WAP scenario and the universe on the right, amongst alternative 
universes, depict the SAP. Ibid., 759. 
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physical constants and laws and our life form evolved in one suitable for us.103  In the analogy of 
having a computer with knobs, which determine the value of all the physical parameters if one 
ever so slightly changes the value of, say, the weak nuclear force life could not exist.  Stenger is 
of the opinion that if one were to completely reconfigure every different value with different 
physics then that will sufficiently explain the existence of life.104 This analogy offered by 
Stenger and SAP3 will be the primary focus in chapter six where I will harmonize these 
multiverse scenarios with FT and attempt to demonstrate that these scenarios actually increase 
the explanatory power and scope of FT. 
 The SETI program (Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence) is based on the sole premise 
that intelligent causation is detectable scientifically.  They implement the Drake equation to 
demonstrate the probability for ETI has a high probability (N).105 
N=N*×fp×ne×fl×fi×fc×fL 
The problem with the equation is that each f is a number between 0 and 1, the product of the 
equation will be vastly lower than the total number of suitable stars in the galaxy N*.  Many 
variables are unknown.  So, the numbers that are brought in depend profoundly on the 
assumptions we bring into the problem. 
 There have been those who argue for the use of a modified Drake equation for multiverse 
scenarios.106 The following is the fundamental form of the equation: 
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103 Victor Stenger, The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why The Universe is Not Designed for Us (Amherst, 
NY: Prometheus, 2011), 42. 
 
104 Victor Stenger, God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008), 137-164. 
 
105 N* Number of stars in the Milky Way, fp Number of habitable planets in each system, ne number of 
planets that are Earth like, fl number of planets that emerge from inorganic matter or organic precursors, fi 
fraction of those planets on which intelligent beings also evolve, fc fraction of those planets on which 
sufficient communications technology arises, fL fraction of average planet lifetime. 
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{ccosmo} ⊕ {castro} ⊕ {clife} ⊕ {ccomplex life} 
Concerning {ccosmo}, few parameters are: vacuum energy density, matter-antimatter asymmetry, 
dark matter density, and perturbations for the formation of large-scale structure. To these, one 
adds the couplings of the four interactions and the masses of quarks and leptons so that hadrons 
and then nuclei can form after electroweak symmetry breaking. {castro} includes constraints in 
galactic morphology and stellar ages and types. In order to retain heavy elements, galaxies must 
have masses above a certain value. Numerical results suggest that galaxies with M ≥ 109M⊙ 
(M⊙ denotes the mass of a star) are able to retain about ≥ 30% of their heavy elements.107 {clife} 
includes the planetary and chemical constraints for the existence of life. Of the planets in the 
habitable zone, only a fraction will have the right preconditions for life: liquid water and the 
elements C, O, H, N, and the less abundant but no less needed P, S, Fe, Ca, Na, Cl, etc. Apart 
from water, other simple molecules are also supposed to be present, although the speciﬁcs may 
differ (CH4, CO2, NH3…).108 {ccomplex life} includes planetary constraints that would essentially 
ensure the continuity of fairly stable environmental conditions thought to be needed for complex, 
multicellular life to evolve. To begin, terrestrial life’s complexity seems to be intrinsically linked 
to the rise of atmospheric oxygen, courtesy of photosynthetic bluegreen algae. Anoxic 
environments do not seem very conducive to multicellular life, although there is much we do not 
know of Earth’s biota. However, we do know that complex life is more fragile and requires more 
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106 Let the direct sum symbol, ⊕, denote ‘together with.’ Marcelo Gleiser, “Drake Equation from the 
Multiverse: From the String Landscape to Complex Life,” arXiv: 1002.1651v1 (Feb. 2010). 
 
107 Ibid., 3-4. 
 
108 Ibid., 4. 
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efficient energy-processing metabolism to be sustained: planetary platforms able to harbor 
complex life forms must thus satisfy extra requirements.109 
 Notice that each factor is a condition for the one following.  For example, {clife} must be 
met in order for {ccomplex life}.  One of the obvious problems with the multiverse equation, like the 
original Drake equation (which has been changed several times by SETI), is that the values are 
largely unknown and are leaping guesses.  Marcelo Gleiser, the author of the paper, discusses 
one of the problems in applying a probability equation like this one to a multiverse is that there 
are several different multiverse scenarios.  If the values of the laws of physics vary from universe 
to universe then there has to be some type of selection effect to account for the variance.  In the 
end, I do not think any probability argument like the Drake equation will be ultimately sufficient.  
There are too many unknown factors.  While each factor is true and a condition for intelligent 
life, the values are simply unknown.  I prefer fine-tuning arguments, which consider the values 
of the laws of nature and initial conditions only (the Drake equation is not an argument in and of 
itself, that is important, nor do I think it should be used).  My preference is to argue the fine-
tuning of the multiverse scenarios and mechanisms involved for the production of the universes 
(Einstein’s field equations, for example) and variance in the values of physics (superstring 
theory).  Environmental factors, like the galactic and stellar habitable zones, merely add more 
weight to the arguments after the main argument has been established. 
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109 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARING THE FINE-TUNING HYPOTHESIS WITH THE 
MULTIVERSE 
I. What Does it Explain? 
Scientific theories should make predictions.  This is a simple consequent to observation.  
If the theory is based on observed evidence, which is applicable to past observation and present 
observation than, if true, it should be observed in the future. However, the multiverse hypothesis, 
if it truly is appropriate to call it a hypothesis, is actually a prediction from a set of scientific 
theories.110 In the following sections I will argue that should the multiverse hypothesis be 
scientific then it would follow that FT is a legitimate scientific inference. This inference cannot 
be bifurcated from philosophy. The classification of whether or not something is scientific is a 
philosophical task. I contend that FT is harmonious with the philosophy and methodology behind 
the historical sciences. 
II. Is it a Legitimate Scientific Hypothesis? 
 In this section I will attempt to make the case that the multiverse hypothesis is to be taken 
as a serious objection to FT. It is not my intent to make a definitive claim as to whether the 
multiverse is or is not science; rather, this section will argue that the multiverse should not be 
considered ad hoc conjecture.  The multiverse hypothesis certainly has abnormal or weird 
implications for morality,111 free will,112 modality,113 and theism.114 The complaint about the 
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110 Tegmark, “The Multiverse Hierarchy,” 1. 
 
111 See Mark Heller, “The Immorality of Modal Realism, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Let the Children Drown,” Philosophical Studies 114 (2003). Philip Quin, “God, Moral Perfection and 
Possible Worlds” in God: The Contemporary Discussion, Ed. Frederick Sontag and M. Darrol Bryant 
(New York: The Rose of Sharon Press, 1982). 
 
112 Ibid. 
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multiverse’s weirdness is an aesthetic issue rather than a scientific issue. The multiverse does not 
allow for subjective nostalgic bias towards cozy classical concepts (especially in the L3M and 
the L4M). As long as there are no contradictions weirdness is aesthetic and not a scientific claim. 
For instance, criticism of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics for being “too crazy” 
falls into this forbidden category.115 
 A theory is distinct from a mere scientific explanation.  Scientific explanation requires a 
causal explanation, which requires a law-governed explanation.  Natural law describes but does 
not explain natural phenomena.  Newton’s law of universal gravitation described, but did not 
explain, what caused gravitational attraction.  Theories unify empirical regularities and describe 
the underlying process that accounts for these phenomena.  Within theories are axioms, a small 
set of postulates, which are not proved in the axiom system but assumed to be true.116 
A scientific theory goes beyond natural laws and scientific explanations in explaining the 
scientific explanations. A theory refers to a body of explanatory hypotheses for which there is 
strong support.117  Theories are a conjunction of axioms (of the laws of nature) and 
correspondence of rules specified in a formalized ideal language.  This ideal language is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 See David Lewis, “Modal Realism at Work” in Metaphysics Ed. 8. Eds. Peter van Inwagen and 
Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
 
114 See Michael J. Almeida, “Theistic Modal Realism?” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3 
(2011). Don Page, “Does God So Love the Multiverse?” arXiv:0801.0246v5 (Jan. 2008). 
 
115 Max Tegmark, “Is “The Theory of Everything” Merely the Ultimate Ensemble Theory?” arXiv:gr-
qc/9704009v2 (Dec. 1998): 28. “The Multiverse Hierarchy,” 8-10. Tegmark accuses those who claim that 
the multiverse is too weird to be true to be stuck in the Aristotelian paradigm—the subjectively perceived 
local perspective is physical real and a bird’s eye perspective of reality is all mathematical semantics that 
serves as a useful approximation. Tegmark advocates a Platonic paradigm in which the bird perspective 
[of mathematical structures] is physically real and the subjective local perspective and all the human 
language we use to describe is merely a useful approximation for describing our subjective perceptions. 
Ibid., 10. 
 
116 Rosenberg, 117. 
 
117 Ibid., 115. 
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composed of three parts: logical terms, observational terms, and theoretical terms.  The logical 
terms were initially treated as analytic claims (particularly under the hypothetico-
deductive model).118  Observational claims were to be unproblematic, understood as referring to 
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118 Tracing the structure of theory back to David Hume, the logical language of a theory was 
considered to be analytic.  In the nineteenth century there was an agreement that Baconian induction was 
an overly restrictive method, and that the hypothetico-deductive method was superior, given that 
scientific certainty was being recognized as unattainable and not as certain as it once was thought. 
Explanations were derived from deduction.  Also, the logical connection between these laws is not simply 
“They work together” since that would be too broad and vague, nor would it necessarily entail “logically 
implies.”  A theory cannot be captured by the notion of logical derivation alone. Thomas Nickles, 
“Demarcation Problem,” in The Philosophy of Science, Eds. Sahorta Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer, 190. 
Rosenberg, 122.   Since Humean and logical positivist methodology philosophers have recognized that 
these strong logical connections are not as strong as they would have considered.  The logical connections 
are merely deriving observable consequences from the set of laws that explain.  According to the 
hypothetico-deductive model, evidence supports the hypotheses that it entails.  A hypothetico-deductive 
argument runs the risk of yielding the absurd result that any observation supports every hypothesis, since 
any hypotheses is a member of a premise set that entails that observation.  This is the idea that theories 
and hypotheses are confirmed by their observed deductive consequences. Lipton, 2. Ellery Eells, 
“Confirmation Theory,” in The Philosophy of Science, Eds. Sahorta Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer, 147. 
This is different from the positive-instance criterion and the satisfaction criterion.  For instance, “A is 
an F and A is a G,” which is a case of positive-instance of the hypothesis that all Fs are Gs, is not a 
deductive consequence of the hypothesis.  These criteria have the idea that observations are logically 
consistent with a hypothesis will confirm the hypothesis.  The hypothetico-deductive states that deductive 
consequences of a hypothesis or theory confirm the hypothesis or theory. Eells, 147.  One of the problems 
with the hypothetico-deductive methodology is that it suffers from the fallacy of affirming the 
consequent.  Philosophers recognized this limitation and accepted the reality that scientific explanations 
and theories could not be infallible.  This led to the development of different inductive and modest 
abductive models (i.e. I-S model). Nickles, 190. However, one of the inescapable aspects of the 
hypothetico-deductive model is that, like every theorem, certain terms such as axioms will not 
be defended by any logical method of reasoning but will be assumed to be true. (Additionally, to call a 
statement an axiom is not to commit to its truth, but simply to identify its role in a deductive system.)  No 
fallacy is necessarily present in doing so—a large number of theorems are derived from axioms 
deductively.  Also, a statement may be recognized as an axiom in one system but as a theorem in the next. 
Rosenberg, 190.  Thus, the hypothetico-model should not be rejected for its deductive problems since it 
encompasses many theorems and axioms derived from the same methodology.  What makes a theory 
distinct from laws is that it cannot merely consist of logical relations to one another.  There has to 
be something more to being a theory than merely having an axiomatic structure from which theorems can 
be derived (i.e. the ideal gas law and the similarity to the quantity theory of money). Rosenberg, 122. 
One of the chief components in connecting observational language with theoretical language was the 
causal structure of underlying processes.  The problem is that an underlying causal structure may not 
provide the degree of illumination and explanation desired.  One of the problems was Humean empiricist 
claims that causation may not be as incorrigible as we may think it is. Rosenberg, 123.  Hume never 
denied causation; he just gave reason to suspect its prima facie appearance or supposed mechanism (or 
absence of mechanism).  Propositional beliefs were based on perception by being derived from sense 
perceptions.  Thus, for the Humean and Baconian empiricist, causation inevitably became habits of the 
mind rooted in association (or a logical reconstruction of Hume’s psychologisitic view.)  This does not 
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incorrigible sense-data and later to publicly available physical objects.  Correspondence rules 
were used to connect theoretical language to observational claims.119 The issue of observation is 
obviously one of contention. How is it even possible to observe the multiverse on any level? 
If there were relatively nearby regions of other Hubble volumes, a prediction of inflation, 
then it would be reasonable to expect early universe collisions between the bubbles. Using the 
W-Band 94 GHz survey of the WMAP data a specified algorithm was used to detect temperature 
modulations in the very early universe: 
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give a sufficient reason for rejecting the correlation between observation language and theoretical 
language; rather, it is a footnote reminder in this methodology.  The hypothetico-deductive view, 
according to logical empiricists, posited that propositional beliefs are based on sense perception in that 
they must be tested in terms of their implications regarding sense perceptions.  Adherents of the 
hypothetico-deductive view must posit how hypotheses are obtained and show how those hypotheses are 
obtained. Dudley Shapere, “Observation,” in The Philosophy of Science, eds. Sahorta Sarkar and Jessica 
Pfeifer (New York: Routledge, 2006),524   Theories have a predictive power under this view.  Theories 
are tested by the observational predictions deducible from the system of axioms. 
The development of the kinetic theory of gas using Newton’s laws of motions as axioms gave an 
example of how causal structure explains observational data.  The approached used was the deductive-
nomological method, which later became associated with axiomatic or syntactic approach to scientific 
theories associated with hypothetico-deductivism. Rosenberg, 125.  One of the axioms derived from the 
Newtonian system was that there were strong grounds for determinism about everything in nature. 
 
119 Jessica Pfeifer and Sahotra Sarkar, The Philosophy of Science, Eds. Jessica Pfeifer and 
Sahotra Sarkar, xii. 
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Fig. 6.1120 
 
Recent theoretical work121 has established that bubble collisions produce detectable 
signals and still be compatible with observed cosmology. These bubbles necessarily collide, 
upsetting the homogeneity and isotropy of our bubble interior, and possibly leading to detectable 
signatures in the observable portion of our bubble. This would be a direct experimental test of 
inflation and the string theory landscape.122 This data is not confirmatory and can only suggest a 
L2M, which would also entail a L1M. The current WMAP data is not as precise as desired and 
the data from upcoming Planck data will be corroborated with this data. Thus, by the criterion of 
observability the multiverse cannot be ruled out as being unscientific.123 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 These are signatures of a bubble collision at various stages in the analysis pipeline. A collision (top 
left) induces a temperature modulation in the CMB temperature map (top right). The "blob" associated 
with the collision is identified by a large needlet response (bottom left), and the presence of an edge is 
determined by a large response form the edge detection algorithm (bottom right). (Authors’ caption.) 
Stephen M. Feeney, et al., “First Observational Tests of Eternal Inflation,” arXiv: 1012.1995v3 (July 
2011): 3. 
 
121 Anthony Aguirre and Matthew C. Johnson, “A Status Report on the Observability of Cosmic 
Bubble Collisions,” arXiv: 0908.4105v2 (Sep. 2009). 
 
122 Ibid., 1. Feeney, et al., 1-3. 
 
123 L3M and L4M will be discussed in the criterion of falsifiability. Remember, not every aspect of a 
hypothesis, theory, or scientific explanation must have every facet of it meet the requirements of being 
scientific. Because the L3M and the L4M are specific to Everett’s Many Worlds Interpretation the issue 
of falsifiability is more important than observability. The WMI corresponds to what is observed in 
particle physics, which is why the multiverse is more of a prediction rather than a theory by itself. 
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 A scientific theory, explanation, or prediction must be put in empirical harms way even 
though empirical evidence is not a necessary condition for a theory to be scientific.  Scientific 
theories must be supported by facts and empirical evidence is certainly a sufficient condition for 
science and is preferred depending on the discipline.  If the theory is based on facts then it should 
be able to withstand scrutiny when compared to with relevant facts that could potentially falsify 
the theory.  Contrary to Karl Popper’s line of demarcation between science and pseudoscience, a 
theory absent of evidence is not scientific—it is mere speculation.124  Popper’s model allows for 
a theory to be scientific prior to and supported evidence.  There is no positive case for purporting 
a theory under his model. There can only be a negative case to falsify it and as long as it may be 
potentially falsified it is scientific.  Thus, a scientific theory could have not evidence or 
substantiated facts to provide good reasons for why it may be true. 
 Lakatos is correct when he states that falsifiability is not the solution to the problem of 
demarcation in science.125  Falsifiability is not a necessary condition for a scientific theory 
because it does not meet it is own requirements.  Thus, falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a 
scientific theory and should be preferred. 
 Perhaps the best way to determine the falsifiability of the multiverse is to look to 
Popper’s own critiques of Everett’s Many Worlds, which concerns L3M and L4M. Popper is 
actually quite pleased with Everett’s threefold contribution to the field of quantum physics. (1) 
The MWI is completely objective in its discussion of quantum mechanics.126 (2) Everett removes 
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124 See Imre Lakatos, “Science and Pseudoscience” in Philosophy of Science, Eds. Martin Curd and 
J.A. Cover (New York: Norton, 1998), 22-23. 
 
125 Lakatos, 23. 
 
126 Everett is trying to avoid the subjectivity involved with interpretations such as the Copenhagen 
Interpretation. A subjective change in the state function would be the discontinuous change brought about 
by the observation of a quantity with eigenstates Ψ1, Ψ2,…, in which the state of Ψ will be changed to 
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the need and occasion to distinguish between ‘classical’ physical systems, like the measurement 
apparatus, and quantum mechanical systems, like elementary particles.  All systems are quantum 
(including the universe as a whole). (3) Everett shows that the collapse of the state vector, 
something originally thought to be outside of Schrödinger’s theory,127 can be show to arise 
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state ϕj with probability |( Ψ, ϕj)|. Everett assumes the universal validity of quantum description. The 
general validity of pure wave mechanics is assumed without statistical assertions for all physical systems, 
including observers and measuring apparata. Observation processes are to be described completely by the 
state function of the composite system, which includes the observer and his object-system, and which at 
all times obeys the wave equation. (The continuous, deterministic change of a state of the system 
according to ∂Ψ
∂t =UΨ
, the partial differential of the function over the partial differential of the time 
being equivalent to UΨ where U is a linear operator.) Hugh Everett, “The Many Worlds Interpretation,” 
(Diss., Princeton University, 1956), 1-8. One of the objections raised against MWI is that it incorporates 
linear theory and does not conform to Max Born’s rule of probability. Casey Blood (“The Many Worlds 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is Fatally Flawed,” arXiv:1010.4767v2 (Dec. 2010): 1-2) argues 
that at U(t), the time of a measurement, the observer splits in to different versions of the state, which does 
not relate to the probability of perception. There is no persevering “I” outside of state vectors that is 
assigned to a single observer. (The issue of the “persevering ‘I’” will be discussed in later sections.) With 
MWI there is always a corresponding “I” where each version of the observer is equally valid. Thus, there 
is a valid version of the observer perceiving each outcome; hence, there are many equally valid “I’s.” 
Therefore, as Blood argues, Born’s rule cannot hold if the perceptions of all versions of the observer are 
equally valid (Blood, 3-4). 
Born’s rule is | Ѱ (x, t)|2 △x, which translates as the absolute value of the wave function, or state, of a 
particle in region x at time t squared is interpreted as a probability (△x depicts the change in the 
location/region x—the possible/smaller indexing for the range of location). Kenneth Ford, The Quantum 
World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 204-5. Allday, 225-29. One may know with 
certainty the probability of the function/state of a particle. Erwin Schrödinger and Born were the first to 
introduce probability back into natural phenomena. David Wallace argues similarly to Tegmark 
suggesting a subjective likelihood for probability (David Wallace, “Quantum Probability and Subjective 
Likelihood: Improving on Deutsch’s Proof of the Probability,” arXiv:quant-ph/0312157v2 (May 2005)). 
Blood dismisses Wallace’s attempt to reconcile probability (Blood, 2, 7). Wallace, following Saunders 
(Simon Saunders, “Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability,” Synthese 114 (1998): 273-404), argues 
that non-Everettian mechanics have similar problems with probability and should not necessarily be 
preferred over Everettian probabilities. To dismiss Everett due to the MWI problems of probability would 
be unreasonable (Wallace, “Quantum Probability,” 6). 
 
127 Everett maintains that, in general, a composite system cannot be represented by a singular pair of 
subsystem states, but can be depicted only as a superposition of such pairs of subsystem states. For 
example, the Schrödinger wave function for a pair of particles Ψ(x1, x2), cannot always be written in the 
form Ψ=ϕ(x1)η(x2), the wave function being equivalent to the state of the two particles. Instead, there is 
no single state for particle 1 or particle 2 alone, but only the superposition of such cases. Everett, 8. 
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within the universal [Schrödinger] wave function.128  Despite his attraction to the interpretation 
he rejects it based on the falsifiability of the symmetry behind the Schrödinger equation.129 
 Popper rightly places Everett’s many worlds on the metaphysical par of, what would be 
considered as, Augustinian science. It is not the case that the MWI is void of metaphysical 
import. The Schrödinger equation does not predict which of the possible paths a system will 
actually choose ( ∂Ψ
∂t =UΨ
). Concerning the actual outcome of a system Everett states: 
Throughout all of a sequence of observation processes there is only one physical system 
representing the observer, yet there is no single unique state of the observer (which 
follows from the representations of interacting systems). Nevertheless, there is a 
representation in terms of a superposition, each element of which contains a definite 
observer state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each succeeding observation 
(or interaction), the observer state "branches" into a number of different states. Each 
branch represents a different outcome of the measurement and the corresponding 
eigenstate for the object-system state. All branches exist simultaneously in the 
superposition after any given sequence of observations. The "trajectory" of the memory 
configuration of an observer performing a sequence of measurements is thus not a linear 
sequence of memory configurations, but a branching tree, with all possible outcomes 
existing simultaneously in a final superposition with various coefficients in the 
mathematical model. In any familiar memory device the branching does not continue 
indefinitely, but must stop at a point limited by the capacity of the memory…All states 
are equally valid.130 
The postulate here is the assumption of a naturalistic understanding of personhood, which is 
clearly a metaphysical import. Human consciousness is treated as a physical system that does not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, Ed. W. W. Bartley, III (Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1956, 1982), 89. 
 
129 The Schrödinger equation is symmetrical with regard to a reversal of the direction of time whereas 
MWI is not. Popper argues that a beam of particles traveling through a narrow slit can theoretically test 
this. Each particle of the scattering beam can be taken as an analogue of one of the world-splits; and the 
whole beam as an analogue of Everett’s reality—the many worlds which are not only many, but also a 
scattering in a random manner relative to each other. Popper suggests that we then invert the direction of 
time and when we do we see that many worlds of the past are a random scatter.  This scatter is arranged in 
a manner that when they fuse they become correlated, even though there was no interaction between them 
before their fusion. This is what Popper believes to be the crux in falsifying Everett. Popper, 93-94. 
 
130 Hugh Everett, “’Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics,” Reviews of Modern Physics 
29 no. 3 (1957): 454-462. 
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collapse the wave function as in the subjective interpretations. The MWI carries the same 
categorical metaphysical import of persons into the interpretation, as does FT. Recall that FT 
states that the origin of brand new information is a mind, which assumes that a mind bears 
properties of personhood.131 Though the metaphysical conclusions of a person, or mental states, 
are different, with Everett’s being purely physical and FT being non-physical, there is the 
common metaphysical category of personhood built in. If the MWI is to be considered scientific 
then the FT cannot be dismissed as being non-scientific due to any type of metaphysical import 
since both MWI and FT share the same metaphysical import. 
 Agent causation is entirely consistent with the scientific method.  For example:  The FT 
inference begins with the observation that [intelligent] agents produce complex132 specified [or 
more than mere Shannon] information.  The hypothesis would follow with predictions of FT.  
For experiments, one would one need to test whether scientific data has complex specified 
information. The conclusion may follow as:  Because X exhibits high levels of complex 
specified information, a quality known to be a product of intelligence, therefore, FT. 
 In the following sections I will apply the scientific standards and the principle of 
falsifiability to the two competing hypotheses. It is my contention that FT and ~FT are both 
falsifiable. Because the competing hypotheses are falsifiable it should be possible, theoretically, 
to test them. However, falsifiability does not determine the truth of an explanation; rather, it 
augments the robustness of the explanation. This allows for a critical examination of the two 
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131 Defining a person can be difficult but the only property of personhood needed for FT is that this 
person, or mind, is capable of being the origin of brand new information—a mental faculty. 
 
132 By ‘complex’ I am referring to Kolmogorov complexity, which states that the complexity K is a 
measure of the descriptive complexity of an object. It is related to, but different from, computational 
complexity, which measures the time or space required for a computation. Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. 
Thomas, Elements of Information Theory Ed. 2 (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience, 2006), 12, 466-75. 
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competing hypotheses and provides a method for how either hypothesis may be affirmed or 
denied. 
A. The Falsifiability of the Fine-Tuning Hypothesis 
 When a new discovery or hypothesis is made, philosophers and scientists must work 
backwards to construct hypotheses consistent with that discovery, and then go on to deduce other 
consequences that can be experimentally tested. If any of those hypotheses turn out to be false it 
must be abandoned or modified. Thus, the emphasis on a scientific theory should be falsification 
and not verification.133  In order to avoid ad hoc conjecture in explaining the data FT must be 
falsifiable. The main premise of FT is that the mechanisms required for multiverse scenarios and 
the origin of information can have antecedent material causes. The evidences for FT will be 
discussed in the following sections. If one is to falsify FT it must be demonstrated that the four 
mechanisms that require the multiverse to function can be explained by the multiverse selection 
effect. That is, the evidence set forth in section IV must be explainable in terms of the multiverse 
acting on itself to bring about those mechanisms.  Secondly, the origin of information in the 
multiverse (i.e. to set the values of the mechanisms and information in general) must have a 
sufficient material explanation for its origin. Finally, it must be demonstrated that these two 
conditions are more probable than a mind acting on the conditions. If the multiverse can explain 
its own mechanisms, the values for the mechanisms, and if this is more probable than a mind 
acting on these mechanisms to determine their values then there may be good reason to reject FT 
as being falsified. 
B. The Falsifiability of the Non-Fine-Tuning Hypothesis 
 The two competing hypotheses rise and fall on the same crux. One of the problems with 
falsifying ~FT is that whatever falsifier may be presented it could always be attributed to this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Paul Davies, The Mind of God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 28. 
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idea of cosmic Darwinism, the evolution of the multiverse itself. Paul Davies criticizes the 
multiverse because he believes it could never be falsified simply because many worlds can be 
used to explain anything. Science would become redundant and the regularities of nature would 
need no further investigation, because they could simply be explained as a selection effect, need 
to keep us alive and observing.134 
The danger of accepting an effectively unfalsifiable hypothesis is that science has no way 
to determine if the belief corresponds to reality. Historically, the scientific community has 
affirmed several instances of things that were in fact not true—for example, the universal 
ether.135  If it is the case that anything that resembles FT can be attributed to or assimilated by 
~FT makes ~FT incredibly difficult to falsify—if not impossible. If ~FT is unfalsifiable it can 
never rest in empirical harm’s way.  Here, the key point that needs to be falsifiable is the 
explanation of the multiverse (FT or ~FT) and not the multiverse itself. 
III. The Gambler’s Fallacy 
 Suppose that by postulating a greater number of chances a LPU will be selected we may 
then increase the probability that LPU is not improbable. Instead, it becomes probable or even 
necessary. The nineteenth century Russian mathematician P. L. Chebyshev developed the 
following rule (Chebyshev’s Theorem): 
The probability that a random variable will take on a value within k standard 
deviations of the mean is at least 136 , where k can be any positive number.
136 
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134 Davies, The Mind of God, 190. 
 
135 Michael Behe, “The Intelligent Design Hypothesis” in God and Design, Ed. Neil Manson (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 289. 
 
136 Where the standard deviation is a measure of the expected chance fluctuations of a random 
variable, say the nomic behavior as a result of the multiverse selection effect. John E. Freund, 
Introduction to Probability (New York: Dover, 1973), 211. 
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When this theorem is applied to random variables having binomial distributions137 it leads to the 
Law of Large Numbers: 
If a random variable has the binomial distribution, the probability is at least 1− 1k2  
that the proportion of successes (LPUs) in n trials will differ from p by less than 
k • p(1− p)n . When n is sufficiently large, we can be virtually certain that the 
proportion of successes will be very close to the probability of p of success for each 
trial.138 
Suppose I am concerned about the possibility that after rolling a pair of dice 14,000 times the 
observed proportion of 12’s may still differ from the probability of actually rolling a 12, which is 
1
36 , by 0.01 or more.
139 To find the probability that the proportion of 12’s will differ from 136 by 
less than 0.01, 0.01 must first equal to k • p(1− p)n !with n = 14,000 and p = 
1
36 , and solve for 
k. Thus, 
0.01= k •
1
36 •
35
36
14,000  
giving k = 7.2, and the probability is at least 1− 1(7.2)2 = 0.98  that after 14,000 rolls of a pair of 
balanced deiced the observed proportion of twelves will differ from 136  by less than 0.01. The 
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137 Whenever the assumptions of independent trials and a constant probability from trial to trial can be 
applied, the probability function for the number of successes is the binomial probability function or the 
binomial distribution. Freund, 177. 
 
138 Ibid., 213-14. 
 
139 This is Freund’s example, 214-15. 
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probability is at most 1-0.98 = 0.02 that the observed proportion of twelves will differ from 136  
by 0.01 or more.140 
 Now, perhaps I can provide a simpler example in applying the Law of Large Numbers to 
multiverse scenarios. Precise, or exact, calculations cannot be made (or at least that’s not the 
present task here) due to unknown variable is the set of possibilia. Suppose we take a sample 
observation of a universe within the multiverse u. Now, suppose I run an experiment with u 
depicting the number of trials n. Then I divide the trials by n to get the sample mean, un , 
depicted below: 
un = u1 +u2 +u3...unn  
The sample mean will approach the expected value, un = E(u) , with the expected value being 
whatever meets the conditions for LPU (this is what would be expected given the anthropic 
principles). Or, my sample mean will approach my population mean for n →∞. In other words, 
the more universes there are the greater chances of meeting our expected value, E(u), being LPU. 
 The problem with appealing to multiverse scenarios as the best probabilistic explanation 
for the likelihood of our universe being a LPU is that this rule of probability only applies to 
situations that can be repeated.141 The role probability serves in this argument does not favor the 
~FT in multiverse scenarios.  If the fine-tuning objector argues that the odds of having a finely 
tuned universe, which harbors life, increases given the vast number of universes there is bound to 
be one with the values we have.  This is an abuse of probability and commits the gambler’s 
fallacy.  This claim assumes a general disjunction rule of probability, that of the Law of Large !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Ibid. 
 
141 Ibid., 215. 
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Numbers.  For example, this rule of probability suggests that the probability of drawing a king 
from a deck of cards increases when each card drawn is not replaced.  If the deck has all the 
cards it is supposed to have the probability of eventually drawing a king is 1.  The multiverse is 
like the restricted or general conjunction rule of probability. By simply increasing the number of 
possibilities does not increase the probability of selection.  For example, say you randomly draw 
a card from the deck and you want the king of spades.  The odds of you drawing a king of spades 
are 1/52.  Say you draw the three of hearts.  When you replace the card and draw another card 
from random the odds of you getting the king of spades is not increased by the first selection. 
IV. The Fine-Tuning of the Multiverse Mechanisms 
 Single universe scenarios require the fine-tuning of the laws of nature, the fundamental 
constants, and the initial conditions of the big bang in order for life to exist.  The list of necessary 
parameters is quite extensive.  However, the most common reaction to the fine-tuning argument 
is to appeal to 1 of 4 different types of multiverse scenarios that suggest our Hubble volume is on 
amongst countless others with these other universes having different physics. To illustrate fine-
tuning as a selection effect Tegmark uses the example of the sun. 
[T]he mass of a star determines its luminosity, and using basic physics, one can compute 
that life was we know it on Earth is possible only if the sun’s mass falls into a narrow 
range between 1.6 × 1030kg and 2.4 ×1030kg. Otherwise Earth’s climate would be colder 
than that of present-day Mars or hotter than that of present-day Venus.  The measured 
solar mass is M ~ 2.0 × 1030kg. At first glance, this apparent coincidence of the habitable 
and observed mass values appears to be a wild stroke of luck.  Stellar masses run from 
1029 to 1032kg, so if the sun acquired its mass at random, it had only a small chance of 
falling into the habitable range. But…one can explain this apparent coincidence by 
postulating an ensemble [of planetary systems] and a selection effect (the fact that we 
find ourselves living on a habitable planet.)142 
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Tegmark’s example is describing a case of local fine-tuning (or coincidence) but applies on the 
universe/multiverse level as well.143 
However, these multiverse scenarios require just as much of an explanation for the 
evidence as a single universe. The inflationary/superstring multiverse generator can only produce 
life-sustaining universes because it has the following four components/mechanisms: 
1) A mechanism to supply the energy needed form the bubble universes. 
2) A mechanism to form the bubbles. 
3) A mechanism to convert the energy of the inflation field to the normal mass/energy we 
find in our universe. 
4) A mechanism that allows enough variation in the constants of physics among universes 
(one of the predictions of quantum cosmology is random constants).144 
The first mechanism needed to supply the energy to form the bubble universes is the fine-
tuning of the inflation field. Our early universe underwent a rapid inflation causing our space’s 
temperature to decrease and cool to allow for the present structures. The current measurements 
indicate that dark energy and dark matter dominate our present universe with ΩDE ≅ 0.73 and 
ΩDM ≅ 0.27 . Inflation sets up the initial energy required to produce these dominant 
forces/structures. If inflation is not complete or efficient then the remaining energy density 
within the bubble must be fine-tuned to give the correct value distribution.145 Attempts to 
circumvent fine-tuning concerning the inflation field have focused primarily on describing what 
occurs posterior to the moment of bubble inflation.146 These effects can be explained by the 
multiverse selection effect but the energy of the inflation field that is converted into “normal” 
mass-energy, which gives rise to the standard FRW Big Bang universe we observe, cannot be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 Ibid., Tegmark, “Parallel Universes,” arXiv:astro-ph/0302131v1 (Feb. 2003): 5-8. 
 
144 Collins, “The Teleological Argument,” 262-65. 
 
145 A. de la Macorra, “Dark Matter from the Inflation Field,” arXiv:1201.6302v1 (Jan. 2012): 1. 
 
146 Ibid., Boris E. Meierovich, “To the Theory of the Universe Evolution,” arXiv:1201.2562v1 (Jan. 
2012). 
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explained by the selection effect since it is the inflation field energy is physically prior any fine-
tuning or physical parameters within the bubble.147 
The second fine-tuning mechanism is that which forms the bubbles—Einstein’s field 
equations + the inflation field. Einstein’s field equation generally appears as: 
Rik −
1
2 gikR+Λgik = Tik  
Tik is the stress-energy tensor, gik is the g-function, R is the scalar curvature, Rik is the Ricci 
tensor derived from the Riemann curvature tensor by the algebraic operation of contraction, and 
the cosmological constant Λ .148 Originally, Einstein had Λ on the left hand side of the equation 
describing the geometry of the universe. Upon receiving corrected mathematics from Georges 
Lemaître and the observational evidence from Edwin Hubble Einstein could no longer use Λ  to 
describe a static universe. But one cannot simply remove the constant from the equation. When it 
is moved from the left to the right side it no longer describes the geometric structure of the 
universe but rather the energy-momentum. 
The inflation field that gives empty space a positive energy density is needed to achieve 
mechanisms 1-2.  Without either factor, there would neither be regions of space that inflate nor 
would those regions have the mass-energy necessary for a universe to exist.  If, for example, the 
universe obeyed Newton’s theory of gravity instead of Einstein’s, the vacuum energy of the 
inflation field would at best simply create gravitational attraction causing space to contract, not 
to expand.149 
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148 Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time, and Spacetime (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1974), 75. 
 
149 Collins, “The Teleological Argument,” 264. 
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The third mechanism that cannot be explained by the multiverse selection effect is the 
conversion of the energy of the inflation field to the normal mass/energy we find in our 
universe—Einstein’s E=mc2 + the coupling of the inflation field and the matter fields. In order to 
set Einstein’s work in proper perspective, in 1865 James Clerk Maxwell had unified electricity 
and magnetism by developing his equations of electromagnetism.150  It was soon realized that 
these equations supported wave-like solutions in a region free of electrical charges or currents, 
otherwise known as vacuums.151  Later experiments identified light as having electromagnetic 
properties and Maxwell’s equations predicted that light waves should propagate at a finite speed 
c (~ 300,000 km/s).  With his Newtonian ideas of absolute space and time firmly entrenched, 
most physicist thought that this speed was correct only in one special frame, absolute rest, and it 
was thought that electromagnetic waves were supported by an unseen medium called the ether, 
which is at rest in this frame.152 
 Einstein noticed how the Doppler effect could be applied to electromagnetism.153  His 
rather brief paper on the relation between the energy and the mass of an object gave rise to his 
famous equation E=mc2.154  This meant that mass energy is proportional to mass.  Twice as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 At this time in 1905 Einstein published a series of articles.  These articles included a parallel of 
Max Planck’s work on black body radiation, his PhD thesis which showed how to calculate the size of 
molecules and work out the number of molecules in a given mass of material based on their motion, an 
article on Robert Brown’s motion (1827), his article on relativity replacing Newton’s laws, and his article 
on the equivalence of mass and energy.  These five works are referred to as Einstein’s annus mirabilis. 
Jonathan Allday, Quantum Reality: Theory and Philosophy (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), 273. 
 
151 Vasant Natarajan and Dipitman Sen, “The Special Theory of Relativity,” Resonance (Apr. 2005): 
32. 
 
152 Ibid., 32 -33. 
 
153 
€ 
v' /v =1± v /c  Depending on the relative direction of the light waves and the frame of the 
observer (v signifies measured velocity). 
 
154 It will be interesting to see how Einstein applies his invariance in his work.  His argument 
developed as follows.  Let an object in a rest frame simultaneously emit two light waves with the same 
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much mass means twice as much mass energy, and no mass means zero mass energy. The square 
of the speed of light is called the constant of proportionality.  It does the job of converting from 
the unit in which mass is expressed to the unit in which energy is expressed.155  With this, 
Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity was born. 
The fourth mechanism is what allows enough variation in the constants of physics among 
universes. After all, one of the predictions of quantum cosmology is random constants. Any 
given finite region is replicated throughout infinite space, which in turn requires a re-appraisal of 
quantum probabilities. The matter distribution in space is modeled as evolving from some 
random initial conditions.156  
Although some of the laws of physics can vary from universe to universe in M-theory, 
these fundamental laws and principles underlie M-theory and therefore cannot be explained as a 
multiverse selection effect. Further, since the variation among universes would consist of 
variation of the masses, and types of particles and the form of the forces between them, complex !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
energy E/2 in opposite directions (now having equal but opposite momenta), the object remains at rest, 
but its energy decreases by E.  By the Doppler effect, in another frame, which is moving at the velocity v 
in one of those directions, the object will appear to lose energy equal to 
€ 
E
2
1− v /c
1+ v /c +
E
2
1+ v /c
1− v /c =
E
1− v2 /c2
.  The difference in energy loss as viewed from the two frames 
must therefore appear as a difference in kinetic energy seen by the second observing frame.  Hence, if v/c 
is very small, in the second frame (the one in motion) the object loses an amount of kinetic energy given 
by 
€ 
1 − v2 /c2
E
€ 
−E≃
€ 
1
2 ×
E
c2 × v
2 .  Since the kinetic energy of an object with mass M moving with speed 
v is given by (1/2)Mv2 (for v/c≪1), this means that the object has lost an amount of mass given by E/c2.  
In other words, a loss of energy of E is equivalent to the loss in mass of E/c2.  This implies equivalence 
between the mass and energy content of any object.  It turns out that for a particle of mass M, this quantity 
is equal to M2c2.  After implementing the Lorentz invariant (and if the frame in which the particle has zero 
momentum), then the equation E=mc2 is recovered.  Ibid., 41-42. 
 
155 Kenneth William Ford, The Quantum World: Quantum Physics for Everyone (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 20. 
 
156 This is still applicable in L1M – L4M. Alex Vilenkin, Many Worlds in One (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2006), 151. Anthony Aguirre and Max Tegmark, “Born in an Infinite Universe: A Cosmological 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.” arXiv:1008.1066v2 (Jun. 2012): 2. 
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structures would almost certainly not resemble the energy and matter structures we observe in 
our universe.  Thus, the said fundamental laws seems necessary for there to be life in any of the 
many universes, not merely in a universe with our specific types of particles and forces.157  What 
is more is that these four mechanisms are not independent from one another. The fine-tuning of 
M-theory or superstring theory itself must be fine-tuned in order to have the other three 
mechanisms to function and bring about any functioning universe or LPU.  Appealing to the 
MAP becomes moot due to the information and values in the mechanisms that drive multiverse 
selection effects.158 
V. The Negative Case Against the Non-Fine-Tuning Hypothesis 
 For a good argument to withstand internal scrutiny there should be good reasons for why 
that conclusion should be affirmed.  That’s the place of the positive argument that I have just 
presented. What makes an argument even more robust is it is ability to critique the other 
competing hypotheses allowing good reasons to reject the alternate explanations. The positive 
case for FT is the role of information and that brand new information can only be the result of an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 Collins, “The Teleological Argument,” 264-65. 
 
158 Tegmark does not use MAP and selection effects to rule out everything. It cannot rule out chaotic 
inflation by the fact that we find ourselves living in the miniscule fraction of space where inflation has 
ended, since the inflating part is uninhabitable to us. As pointed out by Ludwig Boltzmann, if the universe 
were in a classical thermal equilibrium (heat death), thermal fluctuations could still make atoms assemble 
at random to briefly create a self-aware observer (a Boltzmann brain) like us every once in a blue moon, 
so the fact that we exist right now does not rule out the heat death cosmological model. Tegmark, 
“Parallel Universes,” 8. So, what should we do with Boltzmann brains?  Roger Penrose has calculated 
that if there were a brain in a member in a set of world ensembles the patch of order being observed 
should be no larger than our solar system amongst the higher entropy. Penrose argues that given the low 
entropy we find in our early universe it must be fine-tuned to 1 part in 1010123 (calculations derived from 
black-hole entropy and mass in the particular region). The amount of space needed for sentient existence 
is “absurdly” cheaper.  In fact, life on earth certainly does not need the CMB radiation or even evolution. 
Penrose estimates that the entire solar system, including its living inhabitants, could be created from the 
random collision of particles and radiation with a probability of one part in 101060 (or even lower). This 
figure is “utter chicken feed” by comparison with the1010123  needed for the big bang to be in its observed 
uniform configuration. Penrose, 729-30, 762-65. Well, the mere possibility of an observing brain popping 
into existence from the high entropy states creating the low entropy order is trivial compared to FT. 
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antecedent mind. The negative case for FT is that the competing explanations lack the 
explanatory power and scope since the scenarios required in ~FT are either incredibly 
improbable159 or lack logical necessitation.160 
Robin Collins’ postulates a theistic approach in accounting for nomic behavior.  The 
theistic view states that the fundamental regularities in the world are explained by the creative 
and sustaining power of God: God either sustains these regularities directly, or God has created 
the sort of fundamental powers or necessities in nature that underlie these fundamental 
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159 Max Tegmark attempts to reconcile the deterministic nature of the multiverse with probability 
calculations. Let X denote what a certain self-aware substructure (SAS, a subject, or, for example, a 
human being). To be able to predict X there must be three known variables: 
 
1) Which mathematical structure the SAS is part of 
2) Which of the many SASs is this structure is this one 
3) Which instant (according to the time perception of the SAS) we are considering. 
 
However, the probability that Tegmark is concerned with here is an epistemic probability for the 
knowing subject—the SAS. To calculate the subjective prediction of X these factors must be known and 
indexed. Tegmark, “Ultimate Ensemble,” 10-11. 
 
160 On Max Tegmark’s website he has a frequently asked questions section. On June 9, 2003, 
Tegmark received the following question from Ernesto Viarengo: 
 
Is it in your opinion possible to imagine a "scientific theology", based on the assumption that in 
an infinite universe all is possible and even necessary, also the evolution of some intelligent life 
until a level that we usually consider typical of God? 
 
Tegmark responds with a curious answer. 
 
An interesting question. I certainly believe the laws of physics in our universe allow life forms 
way more intelligent than us, so I'd expect that they have evolved (or been built) somewhere else, 
even at Level I. I think many people wouldn't be happy to call them "God", though, since they 
would be outside of our cosmic horizon and thus completely unable to have any effect on us, 
however smart they are (assuming there are no spacetime wormholes). However, perhaps they 
can create their own "universe", for instance by simulating it, playing God to its inhabitants in a 
more traditional sense. And perhaps we ourselves live in such a created/simulated universe... 
 
Tegmark appears to be taking a semi-naturalistic approach in explaining the creation and values of 
particular universes. However, this explanation meets the basic elements of Aristotle’s cosmological 
argument for an unmoved mover. Though Tegmark affirms MM he cannot deny this theistic explanation 
either. Max Tegmark, “The Universe of Max Tegmark,” http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/crazy.html 
(accessed Jan. 24, 2013). 
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regularities.  This is the view undergirding the philosophies of Galileo and Kepler calling God 
the “great geometer.”161 However, FT is much more modest than Collins’ theistic approach. 
What may be used instead of God is a fine-tuner absent of divine attributes or properties 
normally associated with the concept of God. Does this suffer an exhausting death of 
equivocation? I think not. Using a fine-tuner as an inferential entity does not carry the 
metaphysical, theological, or religious import as Collins’ approach does.162 
The, RT, NT, and the MM are explanatorily empty in the end from a ~FT perspective. RT 
inevitably becomes a probabilistic expression of universe locales functioning according to its 
nomic niche in the multiverse. NT certainly explains nomic behavior and should categorically 
encompass MM. Recall Everett’s postulate for the outcome of a state of particles. All outcomes 
are actualized. Tegmark’s postulate, akin to Everett’s, is that all structures that exist 
mathematically also exist physically,163 which amounts to a picturesque model of Platonism. 
Since Tegmark is equivocating physical existence, which categorically encompasses nomic 
behavior, then nomic behavior becomes just as necessary as Platonic objects. This leads to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Robin Collins, “God and the Laws of Nature,” Philo 12 no. 2 (2009): 1, 16. (Preprint). There is a 
value-based metaphysical import associated with this view but it I am disinterested in that aspect of the 
explanation.  This is not entirely ad hoc given the nature of God; that is, if God is a perfectly free, 
omniscience, and omnipotent being. Ibid., 18. This is by no means an argument for the existence of God 
but if God does exist then the laws of nature would be regularities in God’s function in nature. The 
theistic view can encompass any of the three theories: NT, RT, or the MM.  The NT makes sense given 
divine simplicity.  If God is simple then transworld simplicity is true, which means God’s interaction 
transworld is identical and flows necessarily from him.  RT is consistent with the divine sensorium in the 
laws of nature and not a Kantian categorical projection. The regular course of divine sustainment, 
regularity, allows for discovery and free invention.  The premises or predicates are not fixed necessarily 
and the conclusions are drawn out of these regularities in a way that could be described as an exegesis of 
nature.   
 
162 These imports may be the ontology of God, which convolutes the metaphysical import in needing 
to delimit which properties of God have any role. The theological and religious imports have to do with 
identifying who God is. Revealed doctrine having implications for how God would function or act 
according to his revealed nature. It would be very easy to read these imports back into the argument by 
retrospection and constructing an argument in a question-begging manner. 
 
163 Tegmark, “Ultimate Ensemble,” 1. 
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task of probability calculations in multiverse scenarios, which will be examined in the 
succeeding sections. 
VI. The Positive Case for the Fine-Tuning Hypothesis 
 Max Tegmark has argued that the universe/multiverse contains little to no information.  It 
has on the whole no structure. He suggests that most of this information is merely apparent, as 
seen from our subjective viewpoints, and that the algorithmic information content of the universe 
as a whole is close to zero. The appearance of information is “just a figment of your 
imagination” and that continuum physics can be maintained without involving infinite quantities 
of information.164 To argue for the appearance of vast quantities of information in the universe 
Tegmark makes his argument with the following premises:165 
1) The wave function of the universe shortly after the big bang had some quite simple 
form, which can be described with very little algorithmic information. 
2) By Heisenberg uncertainty principle, this initial state involved micro-superpositions, 
microscopic quantum fluctuations in the various fields. 
3) The ensuing time-evolution involved non-linear elements that exhibit chaotic 
behavior (such as the well-known gravitational instability that is held responsible for 
the formation of cosmic large-scale structure), which amplified these micro-
superpositions into macro-superpositions. 
4) In the no collapse version of quantum mechanics, the current wave function of the 
universe is thus a superposition of a large number of states that are macroscopically 
extremely different (Earth forms here, Earth forms one meter [sic] further north, etc). 
5) Since macroscopic objects inevitably interact with their surroundings, the well-known 
effects of decoherence will prevent self-aware subsets of the universe (such as us) 
from perceiving such macro-superpositions. 
6) The net result is that although the wave function of the universe contains almost no 
algorithmic information (we can specify it by simply giving the initial wave function 
and the Hamiltonian), and will retain for instance translational and rotational 
symmetry from the initial data, we will experience an asymmetric universe that 
appears extremely complex. 
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The enormous discrepancy between apparent and actual information content would have been 
caused by interplay of several well-know effects:166 
7) Non-linear dynamics evolved quantum states that were initially only microscopically 
different into quantum states that were macroscopically different. 
8) Well-known decoherence effects ensured that only macroscopically “classical” states 
could be perceived by self-aware subsets of the universe (such as us), so for all 
practical purposes, the wavefunction of the universe is in a superposition of such 
states. 
9) Although the total wavefunction still contains as little algorithmic information as it 
did in the beginning (assuming that the laws of physics that govern its time evolution 
are known), any one element of this superposition (which is all that we can 
subjectively experience, because of decoherence) will displace the enormous 
complexity brought about by the chaotic linear evolution. 
(1) – (3) describes the evolution of the universal wavefunction with (4) – (8) describing the role 
of decoherence, or the loss of information. Decoherence is a loss of coherence between the 
angles of components in a superposition and a loss of information due to environment, which 
gives the appearance of a wave function collapse. A wave function collapse occurs when an 
observer determines the outcome of a quantum state. An observer can be a conscious observer or 
even the interaction of particles.  Instead of a determinate state, decoherence is akin to pulling 
one string out from an entire knot of strings. (9) describes the remaining algorithmic information 
according to the perception of the knowing subject, which displaces enormous complexity. This 
chaos is what breaks the symmetry of macro-superpositions and maintains the micro-
superpositions (because of decoherence).  
Tegmark is not quite clear by what he means by “information.” He does refer to it as a 
relay of content, which may or may not be complex. There must be distinctions in how we use 
the word “information” and how it is used in cosmological parameters. In the following section I 
will make the necessary distinctions in defining information and how it is role in cosmology 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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requires an explanation—FT. This will be the task in the succeeding sections—what will be the 
best explanation for the origin of information? 
A. Not Mere Shannon Information 
In the 1940’s, Claude Shannon at Bell Laboratories developed a mathematical theory of 
information.  The information-carrying capacity of a sequence of a specific length can then be 
calculated using the expression I=-log2p.167  When this formula is applied to genetic sequence 
probability formulas the information being conveyed is more than mere Shannon information.  
The word information in this theory is used in a special mathematical sense that must not be 
confused with its ordinary usage.  In particular, information must not be confused with 
meaning.168 
 Since the late 1950’s, biologists have equated the “precise determination of sequence” 
with the property “specificity” or “specification.”  Biologists have defined specificity tacitly as 
“necessary to achieving or maintaining function.”  They have determined that DNA base 
sequences are specified, not by applying information theory, but my making experimental 
assessments of the function of those sequences within the overall apparatus of gene 
expression.169  The same application of specificity would be applied to complexity.  Given the 
complexity of the components need for and to sustain life, the complexity is that which maintains 
function, a specified complexity.170 
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eliminated by a series of symbols or characters.  Claude Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal 27 (1948):  379-423, 623-656. 
 
168 Claude Shannon, W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Champaign, IL:  
University of Illinois Press, 1998), 8. 
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The ultimate ensemble of all branches of macro-superpositions requires an enormous 
amount of information.171 Tegmark’s thesis behind the claim that the universe contains little to 
no information could be pictured as a general digression of information being unraveled during 
state’s temporal evolution (particularly the universal wavefunction). If Tegmark’s thesis is going 
to work there must actually be an enormous amount of information frontloaded into the initial 
conditions. The information is not merely illusory—that’s an epistemic issue and not an ontic 
issue. This initial information is surely complex. If it is going to decohere there must be some 
type of complexity to it. This hardly seems controversial. The question now is whether this 
information is specified. I contend that it must be the case that the initial information of the 
universe/multiverse must be highly complex and specified to be able to allow for the existence 
and function of subsystems within it (i.e. the information content in galaxies, planets, self-aware 
substructures, etc.). This information required for the smaller finite sets of information, on the 
micro and macro-superposition levels, must be loaded into the initial information content by 
which the subsets of information must originate. 
 By experience, it can be inferred that mind originates information (as previously 
described) and that the other competing hypotheses do not have the explanatory scope and power 
as FT does.  It is by the means of abduction one can infer that FT is the best explanation for the 
data.  Chance and randomness cannot substantially account for the data.  The improbability alone 
is infinitesimally small.  The necessity explanation has no support due to the logical possibility 
of multiverse scenarios being different then what they actually are; thus, Tegmark’s postulate 
that mathematics is equivalent to physical existence is just that—a postulate.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 Ibid. To avoid equivocation, it is necessary to distinguish “information content” from mere 
“information carrying capacity,” “specified information” from mere “Shannon information,” “specified 
complexity” from mere “complexity.” 
 
171 Tegmark, “No Information,” 27. 
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B. The Cosmic Origin of Information—Mind 
 This section will argue that brand new information can only be the consequence of an 
antecedent mind and that material or Platonic antecedents are insufficient to produce brand new 
information. This argument is an empirical and based on experience, which provides an 
uncontroversial premise (experience) used in the inferential reasoning process. The possible 
explanans are mind, phenomenal entities, or abstract entities. The options must meet the 
conditions of causal efficacy and specificity.172 The first condition states that origin of 
information must be causal. Information does not arbitrarily pop in and out of existence but 
requires a source.173 The second condition states that the origin must sufficiently explain the 
specificity in information and must provide more than mere Shannon information. 
 Consider a computer as an example for information relay (a phenomenal entity). The 
computer is and can be used as a channel, it can be a receiver, and it can be a source of 
information. However, to say that the information in the computer no longer needs an 
explanation for its origin would suffer the problem of information displacement—it pushes the 
problem back a step in explanation. What begs the question is identifying the source of 
information in the computer. The answer would inevitably become a software engineer or a 
programmer. Undirected material processes have not demonstrated the capacity to generate 
significant amounts of specified information.174 Information can be changed via materialistic 
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172 An analogy may help illustrate these conditions. Information requires a source sent through a 
channel to a receiver (excluding noise). The analogy fits with the source being mind, phenomenal entities, 
or abstract entities. The causal relationship is the channel, the relay that allows the information to be 
applied to the receiver, which is physical reality. 
 
173 There is something known as ‘self-information,’ which, mathematically speaking, is entropy. The 
term can be misleading but merely refers to the probability distribution or uncertainty of a random 
variable. Cover and Thomas, 13, 21. 
 
174 Meyer, Signature in the Cell, 340-41. 
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means. The computer can change the initial coding from the programmer and introduce noise on 
the sending and receiving ends. 
 This takes it back to the role of abduction in my methodology. What is an adequate cause 
for the effect in question—the origin of cosmic information? Logically, one can infer the past 
existence of a cause from its effect, when the cause is known to be necessary to produce the 
effect in question. In the absences of any other known causes then the presence of the effects 
points unambiguously back to the uniquely adequate cause—a mind.175 
 Typically, empiricists will attempt to distance themselves from committing to the 
existence of abstract objects such as numbers.176 However, Tegmark has a strict commitment to a 
metaphysical ontology of the Platonic ilk.  Physicists are more likely to affirm the existence of 
abstract objects because the language of physics serves for the communication of reports and 
predictions and hence cannot be taken as a mere calculus in some cases. Those physicists who 
are suspect of the abstract as semantics in reference to real numbers as space-time coordinates or 
as values, functions, limits, etc.177 The question present concerning the existence of abstract 
entities is not whether or not they exist. That’s completely irrelevant to the argument and has a 
fair place at the table of possibilia. One must not rule out a possible explanation due to 
ontological insight eliminating options a priori. 
 The task in evaluating the plausibility of abstract entities as the best explanation for the 
origin of information is whether it meets the aforementioned conditions of causal efficacy and 
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175 Ibid., 343. 
 
176 It is not my contention that Tegmark or the Platonist is inconsistent with their epistemology or 
ontology here since C.S. Peirce and Gottlob Frege were empiricists who embraced abstract entities. 
However, it is not common to find empiricists embracing this position. 
 
177 See Rudolf Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” in Philosophy of Mathematics. Eds. 
Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 233-43. 
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specificity. With regards to the causal efficacy of abstract entities, what experience could be used 
as a referent? Certainly, there is meaning behind the phrases, “There are seven cows in the field” 
or “The apple is red” since these merely commit to the existence of abstract universals. 
However, what meaning is there in statements like, “Seven caused eight,” “Three causes or 
conditions triangles,” or “Green caused blue?” What is more is not an abstract-to-abstract 
causation but the abstract-to-phenomenal causation. Such statements would be logically 
equivalent to “Red causes the color of the apple” or “Geometry causes cubes.” This answers the 
question of whether abstract objects can specify information. The ability to specify must meet 
the antecedent condition of causal capacity since the role of causation is analogous to the role of 
the channel. Information does not originate in the source and arrive at the receiver (physical 
reality) without a channel.  Thus, abstract objects are not sufficient explanations for the origin of 
information. 
 Of the possible explanans, mind, phenomenal entities, or abstract entities, the former is 
the best explanation. Neither phenomenal nor abstract entities are sufficient in accounting for the 
origin of brand new information. If one wants to appeal to phenomenal or abstract entities then it 
becomes an issue of information displacement. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION—THE COMPATIBILITY OF 
THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT AND THE MULTIVERSE HYPOTHESIS 
Although some of the laws of physics can vary in their constants from universe to 
universe in string or inflationary multiverse scenarios, these fundamental laws and principles 
underlie said scenarios and therefore cannot be explained as a multiverse selection effect. 
Further, since the variation among universes would consist of variation of the masses, and types 
of particles and the form of the forces between them, complex structures would almost certainly 
not be akin to our atomic structure and stable energy sources would almost certainly require 
aggregates of matter.  Thus, the said fundamental laws seem necessary for there to be life in any 
of the many universes, not merely in a universe with our specific types of particles and forces.178 
Anthropic principles lack in explanatory power. Multiverse selection effects are not 
sufficient to explain the random variables and states of affairs for any universe or observer 
within a universe. The mechanism responsible for the multiverse to function cannot be explained 
by the multiverse selection effect. The information content in the values of these laws and 
mechanism are specified and complex. The only known source of brand new information is a 
mind. There are no known antecedent material causes responsible for the origin of new 
information.  Recall the original argument: 
1) Given the fine-tuning evidence, a life permitting universe/multiverse (LPM) is very, very 
unlikely under the non-existence of a fine-tuner (~FT): that is, P(LPM|~FT & k’) ≪ 1. 
2) Given the fine-tuning evidence, LPM is not unlikely under FT (the fine-tuner 
hypothesis): that is, ~P(LPM|FT & k’) ≪ 1. 
3) Therefore, LPM strongly supports FT over ~FT. 
It is not the case that the premises strongly support the conclusion. It is the conclusion that 
supports the premises. With a mind being necessarily antecedent to the effect—information—
there are sound reasons for the acceptance of FT being the best explanation for LPU/LPM.  It is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument,” 277. 
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not the case that fine-tuning is illusory based on the premise that life could adapt to very 
different conditions or if the values of constants could compensate each other if varied. This 
creates a problem of information displacement and does not provide a sufficient explanation for 
the mechanisms needed to produce the variation in nomic behavior, which requires fine-tuning to 
function. Appealing to a chance hypothesis is not a reasonable explanation since the probability 
of a functioning universe/multiverse is unfathomably small rendering LPU/LPM unlikely under 
~FT. Additionally, suggesting that fine-tuning is nonexistent because nature could not have been 
otherwise is far-removed from the evidence. The nomic necessitarian is left with no explanation 
other than mere assertion as to why the values for the laws of nature are metaphysically 
necessary. Finally, cosmic Darwinism is not the best explanation for LPM, making the measured 
values quite likely within a multiverse, since it suffers the same defeat of the chance hypothesis 
and does not explain the functionality of the multiverse mechanisms. Physicists, cosmologists, 
and philosophers must accept the laws of nature and basic premises of inflationary cosmology 
and string theory with the best explanation being the fine-tuning hypothesis; that is, the plausible 
existence of a fine-tuner.  
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APPENDIX: THE MACROSCOPIC ONTOLOGY OF 
THE MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION 
Unlike any other interaction in nature, measurement has the power to collapse the wave 
function from many parallel possibilities to just one actual result. Everett leaves out the wave 
function collapse for every particle and uses what would be the wave function collapse as, what 
he calls, a proxy wave. When a quantum state interacts with a measuring device to measure a 
particular attribute it splits into many different waveforms. However, Everett maintains that there 
is a singular universal wave function. Everett maintains that each waveform becomes 
actualized.179 There are three leading interpretations for the macroscopic ontology of MWI: 
literal fission, macroscopic pairing, and spacetime point pairing. 
I. Literal Fission 
Literal fission identifies persisting macroscopic180 objects and events, called 
‘continuants,’ with non-branching parts of a branching structure (branch segments), represented 
by a set of consistent histories.181 Temporal parts are used to refer to branch segments, which 
account for de re claims. Simon Saunders and David Wallace suggest 
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179 Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (New York: Random House, 1987), 172-
73. 
 
180 When I refer to macroscopic objects I do not merely mean ‘large’ objects. By macroscopic I mean 
objects or events where quantum entanglement is unimportant or insignificant. Alastair Wilson, 
“Macroscopic Ontology in Everettian Quantum Mechanics,” The Philosophical Quarterly 61 no. 243 
(April 2011): 366. Erwin Schrödinger introduced quantum entanglement in a 1935 paper delivered to the 
Cambridge Philosophical Society in which he argued that the state of a system of two particles that have 
interacted generally cannot be written a s a product of individual states of each particle. |Particle A 
interacting with B〉 ≠ |A〉|B〉 (Here the ket symbol, | 〉, refers to a quantum state as introduced by Paul 
Dirac—thus, |Ѱ〉 refers to a quantum state.) Such a state would be an entanglement of individual states in 
which one cannot say with any certainty which particle is in which state (i.e. Schrödinger’s cat 
illustration). Disentanglement occurs when a measurement is made. Allday, 374-75. 
 
181 Alastair Wilson, “Macroscopic Ontology in Everettian Quantum Mechanics,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 61 no. 243 (April 2011): 366. 
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[‘C] might have P’ is true if and only if C has a temporal part that is a temporal part of a 
continuant Cʹ that has P… Thus Al Gore might have won the 2000 presidential US 
election, if he has a temporal part, which is a part of a person who won.182 
This clearly has implications or agency. This allows for agent distinctions to be 
made at the moment of branching. Consider Figure B1183 in which branch 
segments A and B share a common C. There are two continuant agents, one 
per branch, who share a common part before the measurement. Each states a 
truth claim, or utterance, but each does not know the corresponding truth-
value of the claim because at the moment of branching, or measurement, each 
does not know which branch he belongs to (theoretically).184  
 The problem Alastair Wilson raises with literal fission is that it cannot account for 
uncertainly involved in future-tensed events relative to a particular branch segment. Suppose that 
after the death of agent A event X will occur. Events containing ~X will also contain the 
aggregate branch segments that make up A’s continuant. The question is how can A be certain 
about which branch is his and if X occurs within A’s branches? Wilson wants to claim that X’s 
uncertainty cannot be accounted for by literal fission.185 Wilson argues that literal fission leads to 
serious problems for the application of modal semantics to future contingents. Literal fission 
identifies macroscopic objects and events with non-branching aggregates of branch segments but 
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182 S. Saunders and D. Wallace, “Branching Uncertainty,” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 59 (2008): 298. 
 
183 Wilson, 366. 
 
184 Ibid., 367. 
 
185 Ibid., 367-68. 
Figure B1 
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fails to ensure that macroscopic objects and entities have unique futures—a metaphysical 
pictures is required in which macroscopic continuants are uniquely bound to each branch.186 
However, at the moment of branching, say, agent A is not identical to agent B but are 
metaphysical similar. The mere fact that A and B can be indexed from each other in a quantum 
state makes the metaphysical distinction. There seems to be a conflation of epistemic identity 
without regard to decoherence. There is only one persevering epistemic identity after branching. 
What I mean by that is that A believes he is A and B believes he is B and A does not believe he 
is B and B does not believe he is A. Neither agent would be truly confused about his present 
identity since decoherence prevents us from experiencing the branching split. A may be aware 
that B split from their common C and even though A and B share the same memory components, 
C, no confusion should be present. I suspect this may be one of the reasons why Wilson rejects 
literal fission because in my distinction each macroscopic entity has a unique branch and does 
not conflate or confuse present states of affairs nor does it create ontological uncertainty about 
future tensed events, though, certainly, there may be an epistemic uncertainty.187 
II. Macroscopic Pairing 
Building on a solution to the problem of literal fission the new picture must involve some 
relation in which each object or event stands to exactly one complete branch—this requirement is 
called the branch-binding criterion. This identifies macroscopic objects as pairs <branch p, 
continuant q>, where continuant q is a part of branch p in the sense employed by literal 
fission.188 However, such an understanding has mereological consequences. Identifying objects 
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186 Ibid., 370. 
 
187 See footnote 126 for my discussion on probability. 
 
188 Specifically, this would appear as <your branch, your continuant>. The relation between branch-
continuant and some branch is just inclusion: each branch-continuant includes only one branch. A branch-
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as pairs then material objects and events have no proper parts.189 For instance, indexing my hand 
is just an indexed pairing and not a proper part of my body. I would simply be the sum of my 
mereological parts. I would have no proper parts. 
Modal and mereological distinctions create identity problems from branch to branch or 
from world to world. Michael Almeida and David Lewis suffer the mereological despair of being 
the sum of their parts and treat ‘proper parts’ as the whole of their subsets. Their modal 
distinctions are not merely conceptual (i.e. the abstract understanding of a possible world) but 
concrete in nature.190 Thus, each branching segment/event is its own concrete possible world. In 
treating such mereological/modal distinctions and concrete the macroscopic pairing problems 
have a persevering identity, which meets the branch-binding criterion, but fails in indexing 
proper parts or persevering wholes. The ‘whole’ of a macroscopic object is the mereological sum 
of branch-identity-persevering parts. Thus, macroscopic pairing requires extra commitment to 
properties: where we may have thought there was a single property, macroscopic pairing requires 
us to admit two properties, one of which is had by a pair in virtue of the other being hand by the 
second element of the pair. As Wilson notes, this may not be an end-all defeater for macroscopic 
pairing but it does have heavy metaphysical consequences and, perhaps, adjustment to one’s 
ontological jungle.191 
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continuant x belongs to a world w if and only if x has a first element identical with each element of w. 
Wilson, 370-71. 
 
189 David Lewis’ position is that pairs, sets, have all and only their subsets as proper parts. David 
Lewis, Parts of Classes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Wilson, 371-72. 
 
190 Michael J. Almeida, The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings (New York: Routledge, 2008), 144-45. 
Metaphysics of Perfect Persons, “Theistic Modal Realism, Multiverses, and Hyperspace” (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 135-164. David Lewis, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” in Metaphysics 
Ed. 2, Eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 511-518. 
 
191 Wilson, 373. 
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III. Spacetime Point Pairing 
Similar to macroscopic pairing, spacetime pairing makes identifications to spacetime 
points.192 A spacetime point would be a pair <b, a>, where a is a pointlike part of a branch and b 
is a complete branch.193 The mereology of spacetime regions and macroscopic objects treats 
parthood in a way that treats my hand as a proper part of my body. The branch-binding criterion 
is satisfied since objects and events are identical with fusions of spacetime points and each of the 
spacetime points is branch-bound by virtue of its inclusion of a branch as an element.194 This 
seems to fit my criticism and reservation from literal fission. Metaphysical distinctions can be 
drawn where branch segment A is metaphysically distinct from branch segment B even though 
they both share the common pre-branching segment C. Treating the branch segments as agents, 
A and B share the same mental state/memory components as C but become metaphysically 
similar to each other—identity distinctions are preserved. 
Wilson raises the question of parthood in the objection to macroscopic pairing and 
compares it to spacetime point pairing.195 Though the objection could be pressed Wilson claims 
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192 Under this proposal, the ‘spacetime’ is of the quantum mechanics and quantum field theory 
formalism, in terms of which branches are defined, is not the same as the ‘spacetimes’ of macroscopic 
worlds. The spacetime of quantum mechanics is a single entity common to multiple branches, while each 
of the macroscopic spacetimes is tied to a particular macroscopic course of events. The proponent of 
spacetime point pairing should refer to the term ‘spacetime’ as the emergent entity linked to individual 
branches and use ‘pre-spacetime’ for the fundamental entity common to branches (as in C in Fig. 1). Ibid., 
375. 
 
193 Wilson advocates for a supersubstantivalist view, which identifies material objects and events 
directly with spatiotemporal regions, and then identifies spatiotemporal regions with mereological fusions 
of spacetime points. Ibid., 373-74. 
 
194 Ibid., 374. 
 
195 Additionally, Wilson argues that this has an advantage over literal fission because it can account 
for objective probability claims. Wilson, 375. I do not see the necessity of preserving objective 
probability (i.e. Born’s rule). It may keep for a tidy explanation by accommodating the rule but I believe a 
philosophically robust interpretation can treat one’s physical ontology as deterministic and rest 
probability calculations at the feet of epistemic limits. 
! 85!
the problem less damning. If pairs are mereological simples (or basic mereological units), then 
spacetime points will have no parts. If pairs are treated as sets, and that sets have subsets as parts, 
then each spacetime point has as parts the single basic set containing an entire branch, and the 
single basic set containing a pointlike part of that branch.196 
IV. A Final Assessment 
 As previously mentioned, weirdness is not an appropriate objection to MWI. Tegmark 
placed such objections in the forbidden category197 and Lewis called it the ‘incredulous stare,’198 
to which he wittedly offered no response. However, there may be more than weirdness and stares 
that conflict with pairing options (both macroscopic and spacetime point). 
 The first objection is from phenomenology—we do not feel like we are pairs and that we 
ourselves exist as a proper whole. The problem is that we do not really know what it would be 
like to be a pair. What would being a pair be like? Without knowing that, how can the objection 
that our phenomenological experiences conflict with pairings?199 It seems that the burden of 
proof is on the objector to demonstrate what pairings would feel like, if contrary to the 
possibility that we currently are pairings, and how this conflicts with phenomenological 
experience. 
 The second common objection is that branch-continuants are unnatural. In Lewisian 
terms, naturalness is a fundamental property of properties. So, being a branch-continuant is less 
natural than being a continuant.  Thus, we should reject semantics according to which branch-
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196 Ibid., 374. 
 
197 Max Tegmark, “Is “The Theory of Everything” Merely the Ultimate Ensemble Theory?” arXiv:gr-
qc/9704009v2 (Dec. 1998): 28. “The Multiverse Hierarchy,” 8-10. 
 
198 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), 133-35. 
 
199 Wilson, 376. 
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continuants are taken to be there referents of our ordinary object-terms and event-terms.200 In 
Everettian quantum physics, identity referents such as branch-continuant are the best option for 
metaphysical indexing. Being a mere continuant does not help solve the issue either. 
 The third reservation is that we are treating pairs as abstract objects whereas we are 
concrete. Under the macroscopic pairing proposal, concrete objects are a species of the abstract. 
The abstract pair <my branch, aggregate of my branch segments> is identified with a concrete 
object—me.201 This obviously creates ontology problems as well as the need to accept abstract to 
concrete causation. Spacetime points seem to dilute the problem by being between abstract and 
concrete, if such a region is permitted. Perhaps, the best response to this is adopting a critical 
realist position on branching. Yes, the branching actually occurs but our indexing of quantum 
moments is semantic approximations in describing what is actually occurring. Using pairs is a 
useful fiction for describing what is actually occurring during the branching event without saying 
that the branching event is simply a mathematical model for epistemic purposes (adopting an 
anti-realist position). This approach also lessens the blow to the fourth objection, that pairs are 
arbitrary. The order of the elements contained within the set is irrelevant and may be moved.202 
Nevertheless, it remains useful for indexing what is actually occurring. 
 The macroscopic point pairing and the spacetime point pairing seem to be the best 
candidates for understanding the macroscopic ontology of MWI by preserving identity and 
metaphysical distinction. What does not occur is that at certain magical instances, the world 
undergoes some sort of metaphysical ‘split’ into two branches that subsequently never interact. 
According to MWI there is, was, and always will be only one wavefunction, and only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200 Ibid., 377. 
 
201 Ibid., 377. 
 
202 Ibid., 378-79. 
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decoherence calculations can tell us when it is a good approximation to treat two branches as 
non-interacting.203 The universal wave function evolves smoothly and deterministically over 
time without any kind of splitting or parallelism. The abstract quantum world described by this 
evolving wave function contains within it a vast number of parallel classical story lines, 
continuously splitting and merging, as well as a number of quantum phenomena that lack a 
classical description. After each branch-split event the spacetime point pairing, or even on a 
larger scale, your doppelgänger lives on another quantum branch in infinite-dimensional Hilbert 
space.204 
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203 Max Tegmark, “The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?” 
arXiv:quant-phy/9709032 (Sep 1997): 2. 
 
204 Max Tegmark, “Many Worlds in Context,” arXiv:0905.2182 (Mar 2010): 10-11. 
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